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In the fast growing online social networks, one of the most com-
monly observed phenomena is the diffusion of information contents, be-
haviors or products through network members’ interactions. In this the-
sis, I study the diffusion phenomenon by examining the individual-level
adoption decision, both theoretically and empirically. In the three essays,
I study the effects of the strength of the interpersonal tie and the social
network characteristics on a potential adopter’s decision-making, and in-
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Recent technological innovations on the Internet, in particular the
flourishing social network websites and their mobile applications, have
transformed social interactions among people. Services that allow users
to connect and share with real-world friends (e.g., Facebook), to track and
discuss events as they happen in real time (e.g., Twitter and Sina Weibo),
and to interact with others based on physical locations or common inter-
ests (e.g., Foursquare and Pinterest) are becoming ubiquitous. Powered
by them, online social interaction has reached a level with unprecedented
breadth, frequency and pace. As people post their comments on new
purchases, review newly opened restaurants, broadcast songs they are
listening to and “check-in” attractions they are visiting and share photos,
these activities are observed by their “friends” or “followers” in the net-
work, who may later try out the same products, songs, and venues. Every
once in awhile, some new topic or behavior becomes “trendy,” adopted by
a substantial proportion of the social network members.
The sheer size of online social networks and their continuing coop-
eration and integration with traditional business models have made them
1
increasingly important in our daily lives. Thus, to understand the social
networks’ impact on people’s social and economic activities is an inter-
esting and timely topic not just for practitioners who operate or want to
better harness the power of them, but also for academic researchers who
seek to gain insights about the social and economic value of these new
technologies. Indeed, there has been a clear call in the literature to bridge
the gap between the pure network theory (e.g., Jackson 2008) and the em-
pirical work on how social networks shape behavior (Rauch 2010). In this
thesis, I approach this question by examining three examples of human
activity in the presence of different types of social network: the dissemi-
nation of information, the search for new products, and the propagation
of influence. In all the three examples, I focus on the micro-level individ-
uals’ decision of adoption, which, perhaps, is one of the most commonly
observed user activities in online social networks. Consider, for example,
• a user chooses whether or not to “follow” someone else (the diffu-
sion of one’s popularity);
• a user chooses whether or not to “like,” comment on, or share an
interesting post authored by a friend (the diffusion of informational
content);
• a user chooses whether or not to join the discussion on certain
trendy topic by adding a “hashtag” in his or her messages (the diffu-
sion of public discussion);
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• a user chooses whether or not to try out some new restaurant rec-
ommended by many friends (the diffusion of new behavior).
To study individual adoptions in social networks has its unique op-
portunities and challenges, some of which are shared by social science re-
search of online networks in general. For example, while the phenomenon
of user adoptions in networks is commonplace, as exemplified above, few
of its instances involve any explicit financial reward or value transfer be-
tween the users. In fact, in these online processes, we typically observe
absolutely no information about “price,” which is perhaps the single most
frequently used term in economics. Rather, in this environment, social
and technological factors also play a very important role. Hence, it is
by nature an area where economics intersects sociology and information
systems. In terms of conducting statistical analysis, the datasets collected
from the Internet usually contain the social network users’ (binary) inter-
personal relationships as the only observed individual attributes. Detailed
personal information, such as the demographic or socioeconomic charac-
teristics that are widely used in empirical economics research, is unavail-
able. This is a situation faced by many researchers in this area, partly be-
cause of the usually huge size of online social networks that makes it ex-
tremely hard to record detailed personal information and partly because
of the privacy concerns. Yet, such datasets also have their advantages.
For example, the data in most cases is machine recorded, which indicates
that the data has fewer measurement errors and, more importantly, the
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data is produced in a strictly defined technological environment. This
could possibly give researchers more structure in building models for in-
terpreting the data. Moreover, the interpersonal relationships are given
explicitly, so it provides researchers opportunities (and in the meantime
also challenges) to uncover implied personal characteristics embedded in
the network graph, either by applying social network analysis techniques
or more advanced machine learning toolsets.
The three chapters proceed as follows. I start by looking at the dis-
semination of information in a social broadcasting environment in Chap-
ter Two. Recent years have seen a tremendous growth of social broadcast-
ing technologies. They have greatly facilitated open access to information
worldwide, not only by powering decentralized information production
and consumption, but also by expediting information diffusion through
social interactions like content sharing. I study users’ voluntary informa-
tion sharing in the context of Twitter, the predominant social broadcast-
ing site, by simultaneously modeling both the technology and users’ social
exchange on top of it. I collect a detailed dataset about the information-
sharing activity on Twitter, called retweet, and document the statistical
relationships between the users’ social network characteristics and their
retweeting acts. I estimate a two-stage individual-decision model using
the conditional Maximum Likelihood (ML) method. The empirical results
convincingly support our hypothesis: Weak ties are more likely to engage
in the social exchange process of content sharing. I find that after an
4
author posts a median quality (as defined in the sample) tweet, the like-
lihood that a unidirectional follower will retweet is 3.1% higher than the
likelihood that a bidirectional follower will.
In the third chapter, I turn to the topic of how location-based so-
cial networks help consumers search for venues that meet their needs and
tastes. Specifically, I study the micro structure of the endorsement effect
of social network neighbors’ check-ins on a potential new customer’s de-
cision of visiting a venue. The empirical analyses are conducted on a
unique panel dataset in which I observe both the explicit interpersonal
relationships and the sequential check-ins made by the users. The key
result is that the (normalized) number of unique endorsements is a bad
predictor of the likelihood of a new visit. I suggest that a more detailed
relationship between each connected pair of individuals be considered,
for example their “proximity” implied by the network structure. Draw-
ing upon the literature in sociology and computer science, I show that
weighting the influencers’ endorsements by a parsimonious “proximity”
measure can yield a better result. It thus means that an endorsement
is expected to have a larger effect if it comes from a “closer” network
neighbor. The finding indicates the location-based social networks facili-
tate people’s search for experience goods, such as restaurants, by easing
the observation learning for their users. Additionally, I find that repeated
check-ins have a larger effect, resembling a word-of-mouth effect. In deal-
ing with the endogeneity problem, I apply the machine learning technique
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nonnegative matrix factorization to uncover agents’ latent features from
the network graph.
Building upon these results, in particular the result on strong and
weak ties’ distinct roles in different diffusion processes, I propose a net-
work user-influence measure in the fourth chapter. To make our measure
as widely applicable as possible, I require no individual (demographic or
socioeconomic) characteristics be available. But I do assume an explicit
topic-specific influence network graph is observed, as is the case in the
preceding two chapters. I start from a probabilistic model of individ-
ual adoption, and then mathematically develop the measure, which has a
clear network-level economic interpretation. I then show that our measure
of influence admits the famous centrality measure PageRank as a special
case. In numerical experiments, I show that our measure has a higher de-
gree of freedom beyond the PageRank algorithm, and this freedom makes
our measure a more powerful tool in capturing richer structure of the
influence distribution among a population.
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Chapter 2
Content Sharing in a Social Broadcasting
Environment: Evidences from Twitter
2.1 Introduction
At 10:24 p.m. EST, May 1, 2011, one hour and eleven minutes before
the formal announcement of Osama Bin Laden’s death by U.S. President
Barack Obama, the following message was posted on Twitter by Mr. Keith
Urbahn,1
So I’m told by a reputable person they have killed Osama Bin
Laden...
The post quickly attracted attention and got forwarded by Mr. Urbahn’s
subscribers on Twitter, and within two minutes, there were already more
than 300 reactions to it. In the following hour, tens of thousands more
users in the Twitter world were passing this message, and the final num-
ber of people who got exposed to the information before the formal White
House announcement was even higher.
1@keithurbahn, http://twitter.com/keithurbahn.
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This example not only shows the sheer power of Twitter as a fast-
growing social medium, but also demonstrates that, the emerging social
media can beat even their mainstream competitors in terms of speed,
flexibility, and reach, especially in tracking events as they unfold in real
time.2 The unique advantage of websites like Twitter in disseminating
news comes from their distinctive technological infrastructure. Although
Twitter and a number of other similar online services, such as Tumblr and
Sina Weibo, are usually referred to as micro-blogging or social networking
sites, these labels fail to capture their whole essence — that these web-
sites each are simultaneously a broadcasting service and a social network.
Like content from most traditional mass media, user-generated content on
these sites is accessible by the public and is broadcasted through directed
subscription. The subscription relationships, as the only kind of user re-
lationship, constitute the accompanying social network. The coexistence
of a broadcasting service and a social network makes the combination of
facets easily distinguishable from each one’s respective standalone peers.
On the one hand, the broadcasting service differs from traditional mass
media like TV or radio in its decentralized structure and its social in-
gredient; it represents the full spectrum of communications, from head-
line news to personal and private communications (Wu et al. 2011). On
the other hand, the social network, derived from content-subscription re-
2Indeed, this capability has been proven again and again during events such as the
2009 Iran election, the 2011 Middle East Revolution, and the 2012 Chinese political
scandal.
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lationships, also significantly differs from traditional online social net-
works, which typically map real-world friendships or connections. For ex-
ample, the social network on Twitter is quite open and loose compared to
the social network on Facebook because the follower–following relation-
ship on Twitter can be established unilaterally and usually cuts across
long (real-world) social distances. This combination gives these technolo-
gies unique advantages in facilitating information diffusion and justifies
assigning them to a new category, which we call social broadcasting net-
works. This view is also explicitly or implicitly shared by many computer
and information scientists. For example, Kwak et al. (2010) suggested
that Twitter more closely resembles an information sharing site than a
traditional social network. Bakshy et al. (2011) noted that “unlike other
user-declared networks, Twitter is expressly devoted to disseminating in-
formation.” Social broadcasting networks have blurred the traditional
boundary between social networks and news media by adding the “so-
cial” ingredient into the cycle of information production, exchange, and
consumption (Kwak et al. 2010, Wu et al. 2011, Socialflow 2011).
As exemplified by the Bin-Laden case, information diffusion in so-
cial broadcasting networks critically relies on social interactions, such as
content sharing. Indeed, without the voluntary relaying of Mr. Urbahn’s
message by numerous Twitter users, that single post might never have
triggered an avalanche of reactions and reached an audience far beyond
9
Mr. Urbahn’s own subscribers.3 Content sharing is a critical mechanism
of information diffusion in social broadcasting networks and is vital to a
network’s proper functioning and thriving. When interesting or important
information does not get passed on, the social broadcasting network fails
to reach its full potential as a news medium; meanwhile, excess trans-
mission of redundant or trivial information creates information overload
and lowers the value of a social broadcasting network to the users. Un-
derstanding the information relaying process is thus both interesting and
important. The objective of this chapter is to make an early step in this di-
rection by examing the sharing decision-making process at the individual
level. As suggested, one defining feature of social broadcasting networks
is that they possess a large volume of weak interpersonal relationships.
Thus, our central goal in this chapter is to address the following research
question:
Research Question How does the strength of the interpersonal tie mod-
erate people’s voluntary content sharing behavior in a social broad-
casting network?
Exploring the question might further reveal people’s motivation in pass-
ing on information.
3According to social media company SocialFlow, Keith Urbahn wasn’t the first to
speculate Bin Laden’s death after the news was released about the presidential address.
However, Keith Urbahn’s tweet proved to be a watershed in people’s discussion on
Twitter regarding the presidential address.
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Users’ voluntary content sharing is a social exchange process (Blau
1964) that involves the content’s creator, the sharer, and the sharer’s
subscribers. To develop and test a theoretical model explaining how tie
strength moderates people’s decisions to engage in the social exchange,
we draw on two streams of prior research: the literature on tie strength
and the literature on people’s pro-social behavior.
Plenty of literature has looked at the implications of tie strength
in a variety of social or economic settings. For example, Granovetter
(1973) did the pioneering work on the role that weak ties played when
people search for jobs, the result of which is famously summarized as
the strength of weak ties (SWT). The arguments of SWT suggest the impor-
tance of weak ties (i.e., ties with acquaintances, rather than close friends)
in enabling novel information to flow across two densely knit groups of
close friends. Levin and Cross (2004) proposed and tested a model of
dyadic knowledge exchange taking into account trust and tie strength be-
tween the two parties. Their results also suggested that weak ties provide
access to nonredundant information. Bapna, Gupta, Rice, and Sundarara-
jan (2012) studied the link between strength of social ties and trust in an
online social network using data from a Facebook application. They found
that for the average user social tie strength as measured by actively inter-
acting with someone else is positively linked to trust.
Researchers have also extensively studied people’s motivation of
sharing knowledge in online environment where explicit financial com-
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pensation is often absent (Wasko and Faraj 2005, Bock et al. 2005, Chiu
et al. 2006, Olivera et al. 2008). However, most of the previous studies
focus on sharing behavior in the form of helping others (often strangers)
solve problems by contributing one’s own knowledge. Bock et al. (2005)
surveyed 154 managers from 27 Korean organizations and found that
anticipated reciprocal relationships affect individual’s attitudes toward
knowledge sharing. Chiu et al. (2006) also found that social interac-
tion ties, reciprocity, and identification increased individuals’ quantity of
knowledge sharing by surveying 310 members of one professional vir-
tual community in Taiwan. Olivera et al. (2008) developed a framework
for understanding contribution behaviors and delineated three mediat-
ing mechanisms : awareness, searching and matching, and formulation
and delivery. The sharing behavior we study is people’s voluntary infor-
mation relaying decision, which is a quite different type of contribution.
Wasko and Faraj (2005) applied theories of collective action to examine
how individual motivations and social capital influence knowledge contri-
bution in electronic networks. Using survey data and archival data from
one electronic network supporting a professional legal association, they
found that people contribute their knowledge when they perceive that it
enhances their professional reputations, when they have the experience
to share, and when they are structurally embedded in the network. The
current chapter can be viewed as an extension of Wasko and Faraj (2005)
in the sense that we are also examing people’s contribution behavior on
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a electronic network. However, this chapter departs from previous litera-
ture in two important ways. In terms of data and method, we use micro-
level data and a two-stage discrete choice model to study a relatively new
form of sharing behavior–relaying information contributed by others–on
a social broadcasting network which is also a new form of virtual commu-
nity. In terms of theory, we integrate SWT with the general framework of
social exchange to develop a new theoretical model to examine the rela-
tionship between network characteristics and retweeting behavior.
Our theoretical model posits that one’s motivation for engaging
in the social exchange process of content sharing is the latent benefit
of perceived reputation enhancement resulting from consumption of the
shared content by one’s subscribers. The majority part of the latent ben-
efit comes from the subscribers and thus is positively associated with
the perceived novelty of the content to the sharer’s subscribers, which in
turn is negatively associated with the strength of the social tie between
the content’s creator and the sharer. Empirically testing our theory in a
real-world social broadcasting network is complicated both by the chal-
lenge of collecting micro-level data from the Internet and by the specifics
of the actual technological environment in which data are produced. To
overcome these problems, we deploy 20 servers over a 140-day period
to collect a detailed dataset containing information on both the content-
sharing activity and social relationships from Twitter, and we develop a
two-stage “consumption-sharing” model to help us better understand the
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machine-mediated human decision-making process. We then estimate the
empirical model using conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE)
method, the results of which convincingly support our theory.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2,
we briefly introduce Twitter as an example of social broadcasting net-
works and describe the technology-mediated information-sharing mecha-
nism on Twitter. Drawing on social and behavioral theories, we develop
our hypothesis in Section 2.3. After describing our dataset in Section 2.4,
we conduct a series of empirical analyses to test our model in Section 2.5,
and we discuss the managerial implications of our findings in Section 2.6.
Finally, we conclude and discuss future research directions in Section 2.7.
2.2 Twitter and Retweeting
Designed to be the “Short Message Service of the Internet” at start-
up, Twitter was launched in July 2006. During the 2007 South by South-
west (SxSW) festival in Austin, TX, a showcase of Twitter impressed the
highly tech-savvy attendees. Since then, Twitter has entered a phase of
rapid growth and gained popularity far beyond the technology industry
insiders. As of March 2011, Twitter had more than 200 million registered
users worldwide, who in total post an average of 150 million updates a
day.4 Twitter is now one of the most vibrant online communities in the
4See http://blog.twitter.com/2011/03/numbers.html and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twitter for more statistics.
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world.
Twitter: A Social Broadcasting Technology
Twitter is an example of a social broadcasting site, where a broad-
casting service and a social network organically constitute the technolog-
ical infrastructure. On top of that, Twitter users produce and consume
informational content by authoring and reading tweets,5 which are text-
based updates/messages of up to 140 characters. Like content on most
traditional mass media, tweets are by default open to the public, and there
is no restriction on consumption. Powered by its service, every Twitter
user can be a content broadcaster and/or a content consumer.
Twitter users are networked to each other through a following-
follower relationship. A user’s followers are those who subscribe to re-
ceive his or her tweets, and a user’s followings are the users whose tweets
he or she subscribes to receive.6 This following-follower relationship is
the sole interpersonal link in the Twitter network. It is not only the path-
way through which broadcasted content traverses the Twittersphere but
also the channel of person-to-person communications, such as public re-
ply and direct message. This relationship differs from friendship on Face-
5Tweet can also be used as a verb, meaning to post. So “to tweet a tweet” means “to
post an update.”
6A user A does not have to follow B to consume B’s tweets. A can access B’s Twitter
webpage at any time to consume B’s tweets, which, like everyone else’s, are always
publicly available. But if A follows B, B’s tweets will be “pushed” to A in real time.
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book or some other social network site in two respects: (1) the following-
follower relationship on Twitter is relatively open in the sense that A fol-
lowing B does not require B’s consent, and they usually do not map to
real-world friendships as the ones on Facebook do;7 and (2) perhaps more
importantly, the following-follower relationship is directed (A’s following
B does not imply B’s following A) while friendship is undirected (A’s being
a friend of B implies B’s being a friend of A). The existence of a large vol-
ume of (loose and directed) subscription relationships is thus a distinctive
characteristic of a social broadcasting network.
Retweeting: Content Sharing on Twitter
Content sharing is an integral part of the Twitter experience. In
addition to composing and posting tweets themselves, Twitter users can
also rebroadcast — or retweet8 in Twitter’s terminology — other users’
(most likely their followings’) tweets that they find are of particular (in-
formational, entertaining, etc) value.9 Retweeting spreads information by
exposing new audience to the content. Meanwhile, retweeting is a spe-
cial kind of sharing because a retweet is simply a copy of the original
7The fact that users who are connected in a social broadcasting site are usually
neither friends nor even acquaintances in the real world allows us to narrow our focus
just to the online context in studying their interactions. For instance, we do not have
to worry that a favor A does for B online would be reciprocated offline.
8Retweet is both a verb and a noun, just as tweet is. When user A retweets a tweet
t, we call the reposted copy of t a retweet and call A a retweeter of t.
9Posting others’ tweets simply by copying and pasting their tweets without men-
tioning the original author is technologically possible but is not considered retweeting.
Rather, it is a highly criticized misbehavior in the Twitter community.
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tweet, and thus the author, content, and format of the shared information
stay exactly the same as the original tweet. Retweeting can also display a
“chain effect”: not only a tweet’s author’s followers, but also sharers’ fol-
lowers, and so on, can further retweet, spreading the content onto their
respective networks and amplifying the audience of the content to a po-
tentially massive scale (Socialflow 2011). Thus, retweeting is evidently a
critical mechanism of information diffusion on Twitter. Since it was intro-
duced, retweeting has been extremely popular on Twitter because of the
straightforward idea and the easy-to-use official retweet button.10 There-
fore, we use retweeting in the Twittersphere as the primary real-world
example of content sharing activity.11
The mechanism of retweeting is graphically illustrated in Figure
2.1. Hereafter, we call the user who writes the original tweet the author,
and the author is denoted R in the figure. The other nodes represent other
users who are linked to each other via the following-follower relationship,
together forming a tiny community inside the Twitter world. If two users
mutually follow each other, the edge between them is drawn in solid (e.g.,
10The official retweet function is built into most mobile applications, as well as
Twitter’s official website. There is no publicly available statistic on the popularity of
retweeting vs. other ways of information sharing. For example, another widely adopted
way is to quote a tweet and add “RT” in front. An off-the-record interview with a Twit-
ter employee confirmed that the official retweeting button had been the more popular
mode of sharing.
11In addition to Twitter’s dominance in the social broadcasting domain, another im-
portant reason we focus on it is that the openness of Twitter allows us to collect a
















Figure 2.1: An Illustration of Retweeting
R and A, and we call A a bidirectional follower of R). Otherwise, if only
one of them follows the other, the edge between them is a dashed line,
with an arrow pointing to the user followed (e.g., B follows R but R doesn’t
follow B, so that we call B a unidirectional follower of R). After R posts an
update, if no one retweets it, only R’s followers A, B, C , D, and E would
receive it. But now assume that after reading the message, users A, D,
and E retweet (retweeters are shown in filled circles), thereby making F ,
G, H, K, and M , who are not immediate followers of R, receive a copy of
the tweet. Then the new receivers could also retweet (as G and H do in the
Figure 2.1 example), circulating the information more broadly around the
network. One thing to note is that a retweet is also a content broadcast;
because of the technology, a sharer cannot select a subgroup of his or her
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followers and only retweet to this subgroup.12
Using the graphic example in Figure 2.1 as the context, we em-
phasize a few things related to our research question. First, we do not
consider network dynamics (the formation and destruction of personal
relationships among the users). In this research, we take a snapshot of
the network structure, consider it as fixed and exogenous, and study user
behavior on top of it. Second, in later econometric analyses, we model po-
tential retweeters only in the first order (i.e., R’s immediate followers A, B,
C , D, and E), but not those in the second and higher orders (i.e., F , G, H, I,
J, and K). As we explain in the data section, the reason is that we do not
have the network graph data for higher order potential sharers. Third, the
variation of user behavior we exploit is different users’ different reactions
to a single tweet (e.g., A, B, C , D, and E’s reactions to a tweet authored
by R), rather than one single user’s different reactions to different tweets
(e.g., B’s reactions to different tweets authored by R, H, and L).
2.3 Theoretical Model
In this section, we develop the hypothesis on how the strength of
the interpersonal tie moderates people’s decision of relaying others’ mes-
sage. Although we often refer to Twitter as we develop our hypothesis,
our theoretical arguments are applicable to other social broadcasting net-
12In non-broadcasting social networks, such as Facebook, users typically can post
messages only to a chosen subgroup of his or her “friends.”
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works as well.
Content sharing is a social exchange process (Homans 1958; Blau
1964) that involves three parties: the sharer, the content’s creator, and the
group of individuals to whom the content is shared. By choosing to relay
the information, the sharer incurs the cost of sharing13 without being
rewarded in any explicit way. However, the other two parties explicitly
benefit: The subscribers can consume the shared information, and the
content’s creator reaches a larger audience.
Social exchange theory posits that people engage in social exchange
in expectation of getting returns. When no explicit material or financial
gains are received, the latent benefit of a social exchange process can be
emotional comforts or social rewards (e.g., reputation). Indeed, “people’s
positive sentiments toward and evaluations of others, such as affection,
approval, and respect, are rewards worth a price that enter into exchange
transactions” (Blau 1964, p 112). Certain acts conducted by members of a
community, such as sharing knowledge, benefit the collective but do not
generate any immediate financial returns to the actors. Such behaviors
are often referred to as “pro-social,” because social rewards have been
identified as an important incentive. For example, perceived reputation
enhancement is identified as an important factor in motivating sharing
in the information system and management literature (Wasko and Faraj
13The cost could be interpreted as the opportunity cost of choosing not to share.
20
2005).
These early research works suggest that the latent benefit for the
sharer to engage in the social exchange process might come from the
perception that participation in sharing information enhances his or her
reputation either as a connected person in the network or as a person that
has the capability to filter large amounts of content and dig out valuable
pieces.
How large the latent benefit can be, or the extent to which a user’s
reputation can be enhanced by sharing a message, is determined by two
factors: the number of subscribers who would receive the shared con-
tent and the extent to which the subscribers value that piece of content.
The subscribers’ valuation depends partly on the intrinsic quality of the
shared information: The higher the quality is, the more the audience val-
ues the content, and hence the greater the latent benefit of sharing.14
Moreover, different audiences’ valuations of the same content (quality)
should also differ because they have different preferences and different
knowledge sets. For instance, the early tweet about the death of Osama
bin Laden should indeed have high informational value to most ordinary
Twitter users. However, for anyone inside the White House Situation
Room on May 1, 2011, that tweet simply repeated a story he or she al-
ready knew and thus was of little additional value. This case shows that
14Because of this quality effect, we cluster our observations based on each tweet in
our analysis.
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information consumers with different backgrounds could attach unequal
value to the same piece of content, and, in particular, the novelty of infor-
mation should affect a particular consumer’s valuation.
Earlier works in sociology studied the importance of weak ties in
enabling the flow of novel information in a social structure. For example,
Granovetter (1973) theorized the relationship between the novelty of in-
formation and the strength of the social tie through which the information
is transmitted in the context of people finding jobs. Granovetter’s results
suggested that weak ties — those personal connections linking distant ac-
quaintances — were more likely to provide nonredundant information be-
cause strong ties link closely related persons, such as family and friends,
who often possess knowledge sets similar to the job seeker’s. Following
Granovetter’s seminal work, subsequent research further demonstrated
that, in both real organizations and virtual communities, weak ties are in-
strumental in connecting diverse groups and enabling a person to access
heterogeneous and thus more valuable opinions (see, e.g., Granovetter
1982; Constant et al. 1996; Hansen 1999; Levin and Cross 2004). Adopting
this view in the context of information sharing in a social broadcasting en-
vironment, we hypothesize that the strength of the social tie between the
content creator and a potential sharer mediates the sharer’s latent benefit
of sharing. Specifically, on average, the weaker the tie is, the higher a
potential sharer believes the subscribers would value the information and
hence the higher the expected reputation enhancement is. The implica-
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tion of this line of argument is the following hypothesized relationship
between content-sharing probability and tie strength.
Hypothesis 1. In social broadcasting networks, the latent benefit of shar-
ing content is negatively associated with the strength of the social tie be-
tween a potential sharer and the content creator. Thus, given a piece of
content, a weak-tie subscriber is more likely to share than a strong-tie sub-
scriber, everything else being equal.
This hypothesis might look counter-intuitive at first glance for read-
ers who anticipate that, for example in the Twitter world, a Twitter user
is more likely to retweet tweets from those who are strongly tied to her.15
However, as we argued, information sharing in a social broadcasting en-
vironment is mainly a social exchange with one’s followers. SWT suggests
that the followers of a weak-tie follower of the content’s creator should
on average attach a higher value to the content, which, we argue, serves
as a larger incentive for participating in the social exchange of forwarding
information. Moreover, although our hypothesis is consistent with SWT,
it is not a simple repetition of it. SWT states only that information ob-
tained from one’s weak-tie connections is expected to be more valuable; it
15Such intuition might have its root in the balance theory in psychology (Heider
1958). Blau (1964, p26) argued that a strain toward imbalance, as well as toward
reciprocity, arises in social associations. If we think of the action of retweeting as an
endorsement or a favor to the content creator, then a user’s retweeting a tweet from
someone who does not follow that user represents a greater imbalance than if that
tweet were from someone who follows that user. In other words, from the perspective
of the social exchange between the sharer and the content creator, a strong tie entails
a stronger sense of obligation.
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does not say that weak ties actually promote information dissemination
in anticipation of the higher value from the information receivers. In this
sense, our hypothesis extends the original SWT findings within the social
exchange theoretical framework by arguing that in social broadcasting
networks, weak ties, in expectation of higher social exchange returns, are
more likely to provide the path by which information is relayed. We quote
the following paragraph from Friedkin (1980):
Granovetter’s theory, to the extent that it is a powerful the-
ory, rests on the assumption that local bridges and weak ties
not only represent opportunities for the occurrence of cohe-
sive phenomena ... but that they actually do promote the oc-
currence of these phenomena. A major empirical effort in the
field of social network analysis will be required to support
this aspect of Granovetter’s theoretical approach ... It is one
thing to argue that when information travels by means of these
ties it is usually novel, and perhaps, important information to
the groups concerned. It is another thing to argue that local
bridges and weak ties promote the regular flow of novel and
important information in differentiated structures. One may
agree with the former and disagree with the latter.
Our hypothesis suggests that the two things Friedkin tried to disentangle
conceptually might after all be indistinguishable practically because peo-
ple’s quest for reputation enhancement motivates them to facilitate the
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penetration of novel information into the social network through weak
ties.
User relationships in the Twitter environment are apparently not
exactly the same as the real-world personal relationships Granovetter ini-
tially focused on to study the strength of weak ties. Hence, to adapt our
hypothesis in the Twitter world and test it with data, we need to empir-
ically operationalize the strength of social ties in the Twitter network.
We do this based on the observed relationship types and assume that re-
ciprocal relationships are on average stronger than nonreciprocal ones.
This assumption leads to the following assumption, which is key to our
subsequent empirical analysis:
Assumption 1. A unidirectional link between two Twitter users is expected
to be weaker than a bidirectional one, in the sense of “tie strength" estab-
lished by Granovetter (1973).
For instance in the Figure 2.1 example, ties like D-R are expected
to be weaker than those like C-R.
Our measure of tie strength looks natural, but it nonetheless needs
to be supported by convincing theoretical arguments and empirical evi-
dence. We provide the supporting argument of our assumption in Ap-
pendix I for interested readers. Meanwhile, we note here that the em-
phasis on reciprocity is consistent with a long tradition in the sociology
literature. Davis (1970) suggests that mutual choices indicate a strong tie
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while asymmetric pairs indicate weak ties.16 Granovetter also pointed out
that the strength of a tie is a combination of several factors, including mu-
tual confiding and reciprocal services (Granovetter 1973). Friedkin (1980)
measured tie strength among faculty members in seven biological science
departments of a single university based on whether a discussion about
current research is reciprocated or not reciprocated.
Based on the assumption, our hypothesis, adapted in the Twitter
world, becomes an empirically testable one:
Hypothesis 2. On expectation, a unidirectional follower is more likely to
retweet than a bidirectional follower.
For instance, in Figure 2.1, ex ante we expect D is more likely to
retweet R’s tweet than C is. We develop our econometric model based on
both these theoretical discussions and the technological specifics of the
Twitter environment. Before discussing the model, we describe our data
in Section 2.4.
16Davis measured interpersonal relations on a three-point ordinal scale: mutual pos-
itives are the most positive, mutual negatives are least positive, and asymmetric pairs
are intermediate. In sociometry, these correspond to mutual choices (i chooses j and
j chooses i), mutual nonchoices (i does not choose j, and j does not choose i), and
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Figure 2.2: Data Collection Workflow
2.4 Data
We deployed 20 servers to collect data by querying Twitter’s appli-
cation programming interface (API).17
Data Collection
Figure 2.2 shows the data collection workflow and is a useful illus-
tration for helping readers to understand the details of our data collection
process, described in the following paragraphs. From July 22, 2010 to De-
cember 2, 2010, at 0:05 each day, our “pick-tweet” program fetched Twit-
ter’s toptweets webpage, which usually showed 17 to 18 popular tweets in
17http://dev.twitter.com
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the Twittersphere at the visiting time.18 Sorting these tweets into chrono-
logical order, our program then checked, one by one, the number of fol-
lowers a tweet’s author had and inserted into our tweets database the
first one it found whose author had less than 1,500 followers; the rest
were discarded. If all the authors had more than 1,500 followers, the pro-
gram wouldn’t insert any tweet on that day. In other words, our program
picked either 1 tweet or 0 tweets every day over this period of time.19
After a tweet entered our tweets database, another “fetch-retweeters”
program began to track and fetch its retweeting data and would do so con-
stantly during the subsequent five days.20 At 10 minutes past each clock
hour over the 5 days, the program queried Twitter API to get the user IDs
of the retweeters (those in filled circles in the Figure 2.1 example). The
retweeter IDs were obtained in the order of the time at which the user
18Top Tweets is an official Twitter account, which is a “new algorithm that finds
tweets that are catching the attention of other users.” The algorithm is proprietary,
so we cannot give a definition for a “popular tweet.” Twitter’s Chief Scientist, Abdur
Chowdhury, explained, “the algorithm looks at all kinds of interactions with tweets,
including retweets, favorites, and more to identify the tweets with the highest velocity
beyond expectations.”
19The “pick-tweet” program did not run properly on a few days during our data
collection period because technical problems (e.g., server failure) occurred on either
the Twitter side or our side. On those days, no tweets were added to our database.
20The decision to track retweeting activities for five days was made on the basis of
our judgment about how long a retweeting process of one tweet could stay active.
The log file written by the “fetch-retweeters” program showed that most retweeting
activities of a tweet happened within just one or two days of when it was first posted.
Tracking for five days thus seemed conservative enough to ensure that any truncated




As retweeting data came in, another “fetch-graph” program worked
on collecting relevant network graph information. Specifically, for each
tweet, we were interested in its author (R in Figure 2.1), the author’s fol-
lowers (A, B, C , D, E in Figure 2.1), and the tweet’s (first-order) retweeters
(A, D, E in Figure 2.1); we called this set of Twitter users our focal set. For
each user in the focal set, our program collected the IDs of both the fol-
lowings and followers and stored the data in our network graph database.
For some users in the focal set, access to their following-IDs and follower-
IDs was restricted because they explicitly disallowed third-party access to
their data. We used a “protected” flag to indicate this privacy protection
status, with the flag = 1 meaning no public data access. With the retweet-
ing data and network graph data in hand, we produced a real-world analog
of Figure 2.1 (see Figure B.1 in Appendix II). The figure shows the spread
of the first tweet in our database.
We designed our data collection strategy around one important
binding constraint: Twitter API allowed only 150 visits/queries per IP per
hour,22 and our computational capacity was limited. One API visit would
21One important technical constraint was that Twitter API provided IDs for only the
800 most recent retweeters, so that if more than 800 users retweeted a tweet between
two queries, our program was not able to get the complete set of retweeters. In addi-
tion, we found no publicly available way to verify the number of retweeters our pro-
gram had missed. We took a conservative approach to deal with this situation: Unless
we were sure we had fetched the complete set of retweeters for a tweet, we discarded
that tweet from our database.
22This REST API rate limit was as of the second half of 2010:
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return only a limited amount of information, so to finish one “job” (e.g.,
getting the entire set of a user’s following-IDs) could require a number of
queries (e.g., the actual number of visits required would depend on the
number of followings the user had). As discussed in the previous para-
graph, we had to collect all following-IDs and follower-IDs for all users in
the focal set; moreover, we had to finish collecting the data as quickly as
possible to avoid potential significant changes in their following-follower
relationships. This 150-visits limit was the reason why we decided to se-
lect only one tweet per day, select only tweets whose authors had fewer
than 1,500 followers, and track retweeting activity only once per hour,
and why we decided not to collect network graph data of followers’ fol-
lowers (G in Figure 2.1).23 Deciding otherwise would have prevented us
from finishing the workload for one tweet before the next tweet came into
our database.
Data Description and Statistics
We provide a list of notations in Table 2.1.
Tweets, authors, and the number of observations
By the end of the 140-day data collection course, we had success-
fully completed data collection for 65 tweets. We index the tweets in order
https://dev.twitter.com/docs/rate-limiting.
23As a result, we do not have the “second-order” retweeters’ network characteristics
and we do not include the “second-order” retweeters in later econometric analyses.
Studying their retweeting decisions can be a future research topic.
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Tweet level t index of tweets/authors
nt the number of followers of author t
the number of observations for tweet t
νt the total number of retweeters of tweet t
Follower level ti index of author t’s followers, i ∈ {1,2, . . . , nt}
yti binary outcome, = 1 if follower ti retweeted tweet t
wti binary variable, = 1 if follower ti is
a unidirectional follower of t (weak tie)
Vti the number of ti’s followings
Wti the number of ti’s followers
mti the number of times ti’s followings retweeted tweet
t (before ti did if yti = 1)
Table 2.1: Notations
of posting time by an integer, t, ranging from 1 to 65. The tweets were
all authored by different users, so we also denote the author of tweet t
author t, for simplicity of notation.24
The two plots in Figure 2.3 show the distributions of the tweets by
month of post and by hour of post, respectively. The sample frequency of
tweets by hour of post is roughly consistent with the distribution of total
volume of tweets posted in each clock hour in the entire Twitter world.
The left subplot of Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of the number of
followers an author had (nt) and the distribution of the total number of
retweeters a tweet gained (νt). Note that for a tweet, νt could be larger
than nt because retweeters’ followers who were not immediate followers
24Among the 65 tweets, 3 are in Spanish, 1 is in Italian, 1 is in Portugese, and the
remaining are in English. None of the authors is celebrity, partly because of our 1,500-
follower constraint. The textual contents range from breaking news and comments on
news to political jokes and witty quotes.
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nt min max mean median
total 87 1497 457 370
non-protected 54 1189 375 324
Table 2.2: Number of Observations per Tweet
of the author could also have retweeted. The right subplot of Figure 2.4
is a scatter-plot of the 65 tweets on the nt-νt plane. More or less sur-
prisingly, our sample shows no positive correlation between the number
of followers an author had and the total number of retweeters her tweet
gained (a linear fitting line shows weakly negative slope). However, this
simple result is actually consistent with Bakshy et al. (2011), which also
finds that the number of an author’s followers is in general a poor predic-
tor of the size of the retweet cascade.
Because our objective is to model a follower’s binary decision of
whether to retweet, nt, the number of followers that author t had is also
the number of observations in cluster t. From this place onward, we ex-
clude users for whom we could not collect following/follower IDs (flag
“protected” = 1) and users with zero following/followers (assuming they
were either new registrants or inactive members). As a result, the to-
tal number of observations (N =
∑65
t=1nt) in our sample declined from
29,681 to 24,403, a decrease of 17.78%. Table 2.2 gives the basic descrip-
tive statistics of nt before and after dropping the observations, and Figure
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Figure 2.5: Number of Observations per Tweet
mean std 5% 15% 50% 85% 95%
yti retweet dummy 0.0427 0.2022 - - - - -
wti unid’l dummy 0.7598 0.4272 - - - - -
Vti # of followings 1574 9046 25 69 347 1714 3297
Wti # of followers 3304 73124 5 22 190 1117 4970
mti # of repetition 3.2845 7.5216 1 1 1 4 11
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics
Variables
We now summarize the key variables used in the econometric model.
For a tweet t, we use yti, i ∈ {1,2, . . . , nt} to index whether each of its ob-
servations (i.e., author t’s followers) retweeted tweet t. The definitions
of the key variables can be found in Table 2.1. These variables are either
directly observed or constructed from observed ones. We provide the
descriptive statistics of these variables in Table 2.3 and the correlations
between them in Table 2.4.
Let yt =
∑nt
i=1yti be the number of retweeters among author t’s
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yti wti Vti Wti mti
yti retweet dummy 1.0000
wti unid’l dummy 0.0072 1.0000
Vti # of followings -0.0225 -0.0921 1.0000
Wti # of followers -0.0065 -0.0338 0.4436 1.0000
mti # of repetition 0.0493 -0.1508 0.2002 0.1400 1.0000
Table 2.4: Correlations
followers (note that yt 6= νt), and yrt = yt/nt could then be naturally
interpreted as the retweeting rate of t. Figure 2.6 shows the retweeting
rate across the tweets with a 95% error bar. That the rate varies quite a
lot is not surprising given the significant heterogeneity across the tweets
(i.e., the intrinsic quality). Hence, we should consider tweet-specific effects
when modeling retweeting behavior. Over the whole sample (i.e., tweets
pooled together), the retweeting rate is 0.0427, and the 95% confidence
interval is (0.0402,0.0452).25
wti is the binary indicator of unidirectional relationship, which is
also our main operationalization of a weak tie in the econometric analysis.
The simple correlation of yti and wti is positive. wt =
∑nt
i=1wti is the
number of author t’s followers who were not followed back by t. wrt =
wt/nt is thus the fraction of t’s unidirectional followers. We plot wrt in
Figure 2.7, which shows that for most of the tweets in our sample, wrt
is in the range (0.5,0.9). Over the whole sample, the fraction is wr =
25Because we selected popular tweets, this retweeting rate does not generalize to the
entire tweet space.
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0.7598, and its 95% confidence interval is (0.7545,0.7652).26
Some basic descriptive statistics of the number of followings (Vti)
and the number of followers (Wti) can be found in Table 2.3. Themedian
values of both Vti and Wti are much smaller than their respective mean
values, so both distributions are positively skewed and have long right
tails (i.e., the majority of the users had tens or hundreds of followings
and followers, but a handful of them might have had up to hundreds of
thousands of followings or even millions of followers). Similar statistics
can be found in Kwak et al. (2010) and Wu et al. (2011), but the median
numbers are much bigger in our study than in their articles because we
exclude observations with zero followings/followers. The Pearson’s cor-
relation of V and W is 0.4436, as shown in Table 2.4, and both V and W
are negatively correlated with yti.
mti is the number of times someone among ti’s followings (re)tweeted
t (including author t’s original tweet). mti also has a heavily positively-
skewed distribution: More than half of the observations received the tweet
just once (i.e., none of their followings retweeted). Over the whole sam-
ple, the mean is equal to 3.28, and the standard deviation is equal to 7.53.
26We also compute the fraction of unidirectional links among all 110,583,366 rela-
tionships observed in our database (not only those between authors and their follow-
ers); the percentage is 75.2%, which is surprisingly close to wr . In other words, this
finding says that, on average, one out of four edges in the Twitter world is bidirec-
tional. Kwak et al. crawled the entire Twitter network in July 2009 and computed this
rate to be 77.9%; thus we see more bidirectional links one year after their research.

















retweeting rate, 95% error bar
Figure 2.6: Retweeting Rate Across Tweets
We observe that mti is positively correlated with Vti, the number of fol-
lowings a user has, because mti is by definition the size of a subset of
followings. mti is negatively correlated with wti, meaning bidirectional
followers are likely to receive more retweets than unidirectional ones.
2.5 Empirical Model and Results
In this section we use our retweet dataset to perform empirical
tests on our hypothesis. Instead of using standard reduced-form econo-
metric methods for binary response (e.g., probit or logit), we take a more
structural approach, modeling both the user behavior and special features
of social broadcasting technology. We then use MLE technique to estimate



















weak-ties rate, 95% error bar
Figure 2.7: Weak-Tie Rate Across Tweets
rt 0 rt 1 rt 2 rt 3 rt 4
τ1 τ2
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Figure 2.8: (Re)Tweets Entering a Twitter User’s Timeline
2.5.1 Conditional MLE
We model a two-stage, consumption-retweeting process, in which
consumption is the necessary first step for retweeting. We first describe
the two stages and derive the likelihood function that would be used in




The first stage models whether a follower of author t, say, ti, after
receiving a tweet, actually consumes it. Figure 2.8 illustrates the tech-
nological aspect of this stage. The horizontal line stands for ti’s home
timeline or Twitter feed, which is a stream of received tweets for ti to con-
sume (read), including retweets, listed in chronological order. Note that
not only the original tweet t but also ti’s followings’ retweets of it, if any,
appear in ti’s timeline. The downward pointing arrows show the times
at which a total of five (re)tweets of t enter the feed. Between these five
(re)tweets, other tweets are also posted by ti’s followings.
In reality, few Twitter users can or will monitor their Twitter feed
continuously. We assume every time they start reading their feeds, they
consume only a limited number of tweets. In the example shown in Fig-
ure 2.8, the upward pointing arrows indicate the times, τ1 and τ2, when
user ti launches her Twitter application. Because the tweets are listed
in chronological order, tweets posted at times close to the τs are more
likely to be consumed. For simplicity, we use a thick horizontal segment
to indicate a “period of attention” of length L, inside which tweets posted
are consumed. In doing so, we implicitly assume that users do not dis-
criminate between tweets authored by different people. The only factor
determining whether a tweet catches the user’s attention is whether it en-
ters the timeline during a certain period preceding the time a user checks
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tweets.27
Therefore, the cognitive limit restricts a user ti from reading ev-
ery single tweet she receives. In Figure 2.8, tweets that enter into the
timeline in the interval (τ1, τ2 − L) are outside any of the periods of at-
tention and would not be consumed by ti. When a tweet t gets retweeted
by ti’s followings, it enters the timeline multiple times, thus increasing
the likelihood that t falls into one of the periods of attention (e.g., rt3
in the figure). If neither the original tweet t nor the retweets fall into
some period of attention, then it is not consumed and hence would not
be retweeted by ti.
Unfortunately, whether tweet t is actually consumed by ti is un-
observed. Our task for this stage is to build a probabilistic model to
capture the likelihood that ti consumes t, conditional on observed vari-
ables. Based on previous discussions about the technology, whether ti
consumes tweet t is determined by three factors: (1) mti, the number of
times t appears in ti’s timeline; (2) the frequency with which ti checks
her Twitter feed; and (3) L, which is determined by the number of tweets
ti can read in each consumption and the number of tweets ti receives per
unit of time, which we assume to be a linear function of Vti (i.e., the more
27This “random-reading” modeling assumption is only a rough approximation of the
real consumption stage. In reality, great variation exists in how people use Twitter
and read their Twitter feed. However, because most people receive a large amount of
tweets, of which they are “able” to consume only a portion, we believe that without de-
tailed data on individual Twitter usage, “random-reading” is an appropriate modeling
approximation for us to use.
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people a user follows, on average, the more tweets she receives over a
fixed time span). Therefore, we propose the condition for ti to consume




where b is a positive constant and 1/(bVti)measures L.28 The unobserved
variable ati can be interpreted as an inverse measure of the frequency
with which ti checks her Twitter feed, and is assumed to be independent
of both Vti and mti. The left side of equation (2.1) can be seen as the
scaled frequency with which t appears in the timeline, and the right side
as a user-specific threshold. If a user does not check her feed very often,
so that she gets a high draw of ati, then the scaled frequency needs to be
high for the tweet to be consumed, and vice versa. To derive the likelihood
function, we further assume that ati is log-normally distributed in the
population:
logati|t ∼ logati ∼ N(a,σ 2a). (2.2)
So we can rewrite equation (2.1) as












28Or more generally, we can assume L = ztibVti , where zti is the number of tweets ti
can read in each consumption and bVti, b > 0, is the number of tweets received by ti
per unit of time. We can still get (2.1) by dividing both sides by zti and absorbing the
unobserved zti into ati.
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where the term on the right side is a standard normal distribution. Thus,






















where Φ is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard nor-
mal distribution. The outcome of this stage is unobserved, so we cannot
estimate the parameters in which we are interested just on the basis of
equation (2.3).
Stage Two: Retweeting
Recall that a follower ti retweets only if ti consumes the tweet
himself. If a user’s first stage outcome is a failure (he does not consume
t), then his final outcome would automatically be not retweeting, yti = 0.
In other words, yti = 1 implies success at both stages. Unlike the first
stage, where success is determined by the broadcasting technology and
chance, the second stage outcome depends on the decision made by the
user.
At the second stage, the users who have consumed the tweets each
decide whether to retweet. The decision is made on the basis of a sub-
jective cost-benefit analysis. As discussed in Section 2.3, the latent ben-
efit of retweeting depends on both the number of followers the content
is retweeted to, Wti, and the mean valuation the followers attach to the
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tweet, which we denote αti. Thus, we write the latent benefit αtiWti. We
expect ti’s followers’ mean valuation, αti, to be moderated by the strength
of the social tie connecting author t and potential retweeter ti. Finally,
for the retweeting act to happen, the latent benefit should exceed the
user-specific reservation utility or cost, denoted cti. Therefore, after us-
ing logarithmic transformation, the necessary and sufficient condition of
retweeting upon consumption can be written (with a slight abuse of the
notation α and c):
αt + δwti + β logWti > cti, (2.4)
where cti, like ati, is unobserved, and α, sub-indexed by t, is allowed to
differ across the tweets, capturing tweet-specific effect.29
Technically, we further assume cti is distributed normally among
the population. We also allow the unobservables at the two stages to be
correlated:
cti|t ∼ cti ∼ N(c,σ 2c ), Cor(cti, ati) = ρ. (2.5)














where the right side is a standard normal distribution. Therefore, the
29αt also includes the author-specific effect, since in our sample the tweets are all by
different authors.
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Two-Stage Model For MLE
At this point, we put the two stages together. Equations (2.2), (2.3),
(2.5), and (2.6) represent all the necessary elements for conducting the
MLE analysis. The likelihood of observing outcome yti = 1 for tweet t and
follower ti is the product of p1 and p2, and the likelihood of observing
yti = 0 is 1− p(yti = 1). In terms of econometrics, not all the structural
parameters are identified. For example, we can identify δ/σc , but not δ
and σc separately. Fortunately, for our research purpose, we care most
about the signs of the parameters rather than their absolute value. In the
example, δ/σc has the same sign as δ; thus, identifying the ratio is good
enough for understanding w’s partial effect. Therefore, for simplicity of
notation, we rearrange the terms, rescale the parameters following the
standard practices in probit and logit models, and obtain our benchmark
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specification:
p(yti = 1) = p1p2
p1 = p(e+ b1 logmti + b2 logVti > ati)
p2 = p(αt + δwti + β logWti > cti|e+ b1 logmti + b2 logVti > ati)
ati, cti ∼ N(0,1)
Cor(ati, cti) = ρ
θ = {e, b1, b2, α1, α2, . . . , αT , δ, β, ρ},
(2.7)
where θ is a vector of parameters to estimate. αt — with t ranging from 1
to T — absorbs the constant term and captures the tweet-specific effects.
δ is the coefficient of the weak-tie indicator, which is of our primary inter-
est. b1, b2, and β determine the partial effects of the other social network
characteristic variables.
Results
With equation (2.7) in hand, we estimate the parameters using the
conditional MLE method. We report the results in Table 2.5.30 We estimate
a total of six different specifications, the first five of which are described
in detail in the following paragraphs. The last one is discussed in the
next subsection. In all specifications, we use dummy variables to capture
tweet-specific effects,31 αts, and we do not report these fixed effects be-
30*, **, and *** indicate 0.1%, 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively.
31Technically, we can directly use dummy variables to control for fixed effects with-
out appealing to more sophisticated econometric specifications because we have a
large number of observations for every tweet. See Figure 2.5.
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cause they are less important in our analysis.32 All standard errors are
computed to be robust to tweet clustering.
Model 1 is a simple probit of yti on the four key variables: wti,mti,
Vti, and Wti. Model 2 corresponds to equation (2.7), with an additional
restriction that ati ⊥ cti, which implies ρ = 0. Model 3 strictly follows
the benchmark equation (2.7), allowing correlation between ati and cti.
Models 4 and 5 slightly modify model 3: Model 4 includes the interaction
term of wti and Wti in the retweeting equation; model 5 includes wti in
the consumption equation.
We observe that the fitted likelihood increases from model 1, 2
to 3, {4,5}, as we gradually relax the model restriction by adding richer
structures and more variables. Across the five columns, we find consis-
tent support for a positive mti coefficient (repetition of retweets) and a
negative Vti coefficient (the number of followings). All estimates are sig-
nificant with 99.9% confidence level. Therefore, the results are consistent
with the model prediction described in Section 2.5.1, and in particular
with equation (2.3).
The unidirectional-relationship/weak-tie indicator is found to have
a significantly positive effect on the (conditional) retweeting probability.
In the benchmark model (model 3), its coefficient is positive at the 0.1%
32We do not control for follower fixed effects because, for each tweet, all follower-
s/observations are by definition distinct, and when we pool tweets together, among all
the 24,403 observations, 24,002 are unique.
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significance level. The wti coefficient becomes less significant, but is still
positive at the 5% significance level, when we allow an interaction effect
of tie-strength and the number of followers (model 4) or when we put
the weak-tie indicator into both the consumption and retweeting equa-
tions (model 5). These results show that, in the retweeting equation, the
positive sign of the weak-tie coefficient is robust; thus, they support our
hypothesis: Weak ties are more likely than strong ties to relay information
to their social network neighbors.
In model 4, where we include the weak-tie dummy wti in both the
consumption and retweeting equations, we find that, although its effect
on retweeting probability is positive and significant, its effect on con-
sumption probability is negative but insignificant. This result shows that
messages generated from stronger ties might be more likely to be read
than those from weaker ties. However, the difference in likelihood is not
statistically significant. It supports our assumption that users generally
do not discriminate between tweets received from strong ties and tweets
received from weak ties. We believe the separation of the different effects
that weak ties have on the two probabilities, as model 4 reveals, shows the
merit of our two-stage econometric model. It indeed uncovers more struc-
ture in the retweeting process than a reduced-form probit regression.
In all models, the number of followers has a significantly positive
coefficient. This revelation by our econometric models is a new one be-
cause, as shown in Table 2.4, the simple correlation between yti and Wti
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is negative. This result thus supports our argument in the theory section
that the number of subscribers is positively associated with the latent
benefit of retweeting.
2.5.2 Theoretical Model Revisited
From model 1 to model 5, we consistently find that, conditional
on the consumption of a piece of information, weak-tie users are more
likely to share information with their social network neighbors. In the
theory section, we argued the reason is that a weak-tie follower’s followers
would on average value the information more than a strong-tie follower’s
followers; thus, the latent benefit from the social exchange of content
sharing is greater for a weak-tie follower than for a strong-tie follower,
everything else being equal.
In a social broadcasting environment, two possible explanations
remain for the higher mean valuation of the shared content from a weak-
tie follower’s followers:
1. New audience effect: Because of the social broadcasting technology
(in which whatever is posted or shared is broadcast to all followers),
the possibility exists that the information has already been circu-
lated to more of a strong-tie follower’s followers than to a weak-
tie follower’s followers.33 Holding the total number of a potential
33One important observation is that a strong-tie follower’s followers are more likely
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sharer’s followers constant, the expected number of followers who
are new to the information is larger for a weak-tie follower. There-
fore, a weak-tie follower can reach a larger new audience, and hence
the sharing gives a greater social exchange benefit.
2. Informational value effect: The information to be shared is intrin-
sically more valuable to a weak-tie follower’s followers than to a
stronger-tie follower’s followers. Therefore, a weak-tie follower is
more willing to share it because the sharing is expected to yield
higher social exchange benefit.
3. A third possibility is that both of these two effects exist.
We test the three possibilities in model 6 by adding two empirically
constructed followers-overlap measures into the second-stage retweeting











where W̄ti, Wt, and Wti are the number of mutual followers author t and
user ti shared, the number of followers author t had, and the number
of followers ti had, respectively. OIW1ti and OI
W2
ti basically measure how
“similar” user ti’s followers and author t’s followers are: The larger the
index is, the more similar the two sets of followers are. The indexes are
to be simultaneously following the author than a weak-tie follower’s followers. Readers
can refer to Appendix I for an empirical test.
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also used in Appendix I, where we test whether unidirectional relation-
ships are weaker than bidirectional ones. Readers can refer to Appendix I
to see more discussion on the indexes.
We include OIW1ti and OI
W2
ti to capture the new audience effect, the
first explanation. If it is indeed a driver of the result, we expect OIW1ti and
OIW2ti collectively to have a negative effect on retweeting probability: If
a user has a large number of followers who also follow the author, then
he or she should be less willing to share the information. Moreover, if
the new audience effect is the sole driver, then the weak-tie indicator wti
should have no effect on retweeting probability once we include the two
indexes.34 If we find the two indexes have negative coefficients and the
weak-tie indicator still has a positive coefficient, then we should conclude
that both the informational value effect and the new audience effect exist.
The result of model 6 shows that the coefficients of the two in-
dexes are indeed negative. Although the second version of the overlap
index, OIW2ti , separately is insignificant, collectively they are significant
with 99.9% confidence level. The magnitude of the coefficient of wti de-
creases from model 3, but, it is still positive at 0.1% significance level.
These two findings together support the third possibility: Both the infor-
mational value effect and the new audience effect exist.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Internet display advertisement is often priced based on cost per
impression or cost per action (e.g., cost per purchase, cost per click). How-
ever, it is important to realize that an ad being displayed is not equivalent
to an ad being consumed. In other words, between the stage of impression
and action is a stage of consumption, which does not necessarily occur af-
ter an impression because Internet users are often overloaded with infor-
mation. The popularization of social broadcasting technologies, or social
media as a whole, has greatly facilitated decentralized information pro-
duction, which further leads to an explosion of user-generated content.35
Then the question arises: Of the content being produced, how much is ac-
tually being consumed? One answer to this practical, important question
suggests the possibility of another way of pricing for display advertise-
ment: cost per ad consumption. This approach has largely been ignored
in the literature because ascertaining whether an Internet user actually
reads or watches an ad is difficult. Indeed, neither the content creator nor
any third-party can observe whether an individual has consumed a piece
of content supplied to him or her.
What our empirical model can contribute is that the estimation of
equation (2.3) provides a simple yet useful way to quantify the consump-
35Taking Twitter as an example, as of May 2011, the average volume of tweets posted
per day had reached 150 million (i.e., more than 1,700 tweets per second.)
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tion probability of a piece of content in a social broadcasting network.
Essentially, our model solves this problem in the Twitter context by ex-
ploiting the fact that observed acts taken upon content can be used to
infer unobserved consumption. A good starting point is to fit the first-
stage probability, which we provide below for ease of reference:.
p1 = Φ(e+ b1 logm+ b2 logV).
If we set m = 1 (i.e., a tweet enters a user’s timeline only once as most
tweets do), the fitted p̂1(V) would be the expected probability for a user
with V followings to consume one particular tweet received. By the law of
large numbers, p̂1(V) is also the fraction of received tweets that would be
consumed by an average user with V followings. The lower/solid curve in
Figure 2.9 shows how p̂1 changes with V when m is fixed at 1, using es-
timates obtained from our benchmark model. Consistent with intuition,
p̂1 is a decreasing function of V , reflecting that Twitter users who follow
more people, on average, consume a smaller portion of all tweets they
receive. We also label in Figure 2.9 the fitted probabilities for Vs equaling
5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles in our retweet dataset (see Table 2.3). We
find that, on average, users who follow 25 people (5th percentile in our
sample) consume almost every single tweet they receive (94.1%); users
with median number of followings (347) probably ignore more than half
of the received tweets (54.8%); and users whose number of followings is
3,297, the 95th percentile in our sample, are expected to consume only
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5.9% of their followings’ tweets. It is an interesting future research ques-
tion to identify reasons why a significant portion of social broadcasting
users follow a large number of people who produce so much more content
than the users can possibly consume.
In social media, sharing promotes information diffusion by helping
users who otherwise wouldn’t be exposed to some content get exposed
to and consume it. The second fact we can learn from equation (2.3) is
that, in addition to helping information traverse longer social distances
and to reach more people, sharing in social broadcasting also helps at
the consumption stage of a content cycle (especially when the problem of
information overload exists) by creating repeated exposure to a piece of
content, which increases the probability of consumption. In Figure 2.9,
the upper/dashed curve depicts p̂1 for m = 10 (i.e., when 10 retweets
enter a user’s timeline). The expected probabilities at the labeled V val-
ues all increase accordingly, but the increments are different (from 94.1%,
45.2%, and 5.9% to 99.7%, 84.5%, and 33.6% respectively). The expected
probability for a user with the median number of followings increases the
most — by 39.3%.
Influence
Measuring a user’s social influence in an online community is of
great interest to managers who want to leverage the power of social me-
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Figure 2.9: The Probability of a Tweet’s Being Consumed upon Receipt
people retweet her tweets. Indeed, the depth of penetration and breadth
of reach of one’s words in an online community are important aspects of
social influence. Our model measures the role that social network char-
acteristics play in the information diffusion process. Combined with the
probability of consumption, we can compute the expected total number
of consumers of a user’s tweet based on his or her social network char-
acteristics, which may serve as a starting point for measuring his or her
social influence.
One important implication of our study is that having more follow-
ers does not directly translate into greater social influence. In particular,
the strength of social ties between a user and her followers should have
an important moderating role, because it can greatly affect the followers’
willingness to forward her messages. To see this more intuitively, we plot
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Figure 2.10: The Probability of Retweeting a Tweet upon Consumption
and w = 1 (dashed curve), fixing αt at the median value in our sample.
The difference between the conditional probabilities of retweeting for a
unidirectional follower and for a bidirectional follower is significant. For
example, when W , the number of followers, equals 190, the median num-
ber in our sample, the conditional likelihoods of retweeting are 6.0% for a
bidirectional follower and 9.1% for a unidirectional follower. The latter is
more than 50% higher in percentage.
2.7 Conclusion
An important question in the field of information systems is how
information or knowledge is disseminated in an online community (with
or without an organizational form). Large-scale empirical studies to ad-
dress this question have traditionally been challenging because of the dif-
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ficulty of obtaining detailed micro-level data. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this chapter is the first such study in the information systems field,
where publicly available data from Twitter is used to explore people’s vol-
untary information relay process.
Using a carefully designed data collection process and a series
of econometric analyses, we find that information is more likely to be
retweeted through weak ties on Twitter. This result is complementary to
Granovetter’s finding, which advocates for the important role of weak ties
in carrying novel information (Granovetter 1973). The implications of our
finding are far-reaching. On the one hand, our theory, which is based on
two highly influential sociological theories – the social exchange theory
and the strength of weak tie theory – and is supported by the latest data
from one of today’s largest online social networks, reveals the important
role that weak ties play in facilitating information dissemination in the
social network through people’s voluntarily information relay behavior.
On the other hand, the interesting connection between tie strength and
retweeting behavior indicates the importance of incorporating tie strength
when measuring personal influence on Twitter, which is a question of fun-
damental importance to both researchers and practitioners.
As one of the first in the information systems field to bring to-
gether the huge amount of public data on Twitter with sociological the-
ories to study information diffusion in social broadcasting networks, the
chapter is not without its limitations. First, the tweets in our dataset
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were not randomly sampled. By using this dataset to study the effect
of tie strength in information sharing, we implicitly assumed that tweet
“quality” changes everyone’s retweeting probability only uniformly. Re-
laxing this assumption requires additional work (including obtaining a
new dataset) to test whether our results hold when the quality of tweets
is moderate or low. Second, we measured tie strength using a binary vari-
able based on whether a link is unidirectional or bidirectional. Measuring
tie strength based on the amount of conversation between two Twitter
users would be an alternative approach. Third, we used only an author’s
immediate followers and omitted higher-order potential followers in em-
pirical analyses. As we discussed in the data section, this was due to the
difficulty of collecting network graph data for all higher-order potential
retweeters. In future research one could try to overcome the difficulty by,
possibly, sampling these users. Fourth, we observed only one snapshot
of the social network and thus modeled it as fixed and exogenous. Future
research can examine the interplay of user behavior and the dynamics of
underlying network structure. Another possibility for extending the cur-
rent study is to include more user-specific variables (e.g., demographic
information) and tweet-specific variables (e.g., constructed from natural
language processing) into the econometric model. Of course, these exten-
sions pose new challenges in terms of data collection and data processing.




Shall I Go? The Unequal Effects of Friends’
Check-ins
3.1 Introduction
The ongoing innovations of social networking and mobile technolo-
gies and their cooperation and integration with both online and offline
businesses and services have given users unprecedented ease to share
their daily activities with friends. For example, music service Apple iTunes
has incorporated a social feature that lets users “ping” the songs they
have purchased or are listening to; ticket seller Ticketmaster’s application
permits users to complete a transaction right from Facebook and easily
share with their friends what live events they plan to attend; location-
based mobile application Foursquare, by verifying users’ GPS coordinates,
allows them to “check-in” to physical venues they are currently visiting.
Every time a user pings a song, shares a ticket-purchase, or checks-in to a
venue, a message containing the information is sent out to her connected
friends, who then can read about the activity, probably in real time, and
might later decide to try out the song, the live entertainment, or the venue
themselves.
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As the social layer being gradually woven into real-world businesses
and services, nowadays more and more of them have begun to provide in-
centives to customers for sharing their consumption experience via pings
and check-ins. For instance, online file-synchronization services offer free
storage space to people who indicate on Facebook or Twitter that they are
using their software; restaurants offer eaters coupons when they check-in
to the franchises at some specific time. The underlying idea behind these
so-called “going-social” promotions is that, presumably, the very simple
form of activity sharing by friends, such as the pings, shares, and check-
ins, will be perceived as a kind of endorsement; thus, encouraging existing
customers to do so can attract potential customers.
However, whether this belief is only an assumption, or it is also
a matter of fact is unknown. In fact, many critics say that social net-
works are overloaded with information that is so “trivial” — for exam-
ple, what people have just bought and where people are eating for lunch
— that others simply will not pay attention to it. Indeed, as compared
with the “old-fashioned” form of consumption-experience sharing such as
customer reviews, the pings and check-ins convey too little information
about the product or business and represent only an implicit and weak
endorsement, if at all. Thus, to empirically test whether and how poten-
tial consumers react to this very simple form of activity sharing in social
networks is important for understanding the economic value of these new
social features.
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In the present chapter, we approach this question by examining the
check-ins that have been enjoying a stellar popularity in recent years. For
example, Foursquare, the very first of location-oriented social networks,
grew 1,000% annually from 2009-2011.1 Bigger, all-purpose social net-
works such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google+ all have introduced similar
functionalities. By using them, users can indicate their physical locations,
such as restaurants, shopping centers, and movie theaters, through so-
called “check-ins”, so that their friends in the social network are aware
of their activities. In our work, we model the user decision of visiting a
venue, taking into account the endorsement effect2 of friends’ check-ins,
examining its structure, and testing its existence using observational data
collected from the Internet.
Identifying social/peer/network effects is challenging in terms of
econometrics. Manski (1993) pointed out the now famous “reflection
problem” in a “linear in means” model in which the behavior of an agent
is influenced by the mean behavior of some “reference group” of which
the agent herself is a member. In our present study, the problem does not
occur because (1) our dataset has the advantage of containing the explicit
relationships among the agents (i.e., the network graph); hence, we can
make a natural assumption that an agent is influenced by her “friends”
1See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foursquare.
2In various academic disciplines, it is also often called social/peer/neighbor effec-
t/influence. In this chapter, social effect, endorsement effect, and neighbor/friend
influence are synonymous and we use them interchangeably.
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observed in the dataset (one is not oneself’s friend) instead of defining a
“reference group” according to certain common characteristics (Bramoullé
et al. 2009); and (2) we assume individual behavior varies with the lagged
rather than contemporaneous value of friends’ behavior (Manski 2000).
However, even though we do not have the “reflection problem,”
identifying social effects can still be complicated by the unobserved indi-
vidual heterogeneity. This problem is related to endogenous relationship
formation, also known as the homophily phenomenon; that is, agents tend
to bond (in our case, form friendships) with others who possess similar
characteristics. If some of these unobserved individual characteristics
also affect the behavior in consideration, then the regressor that captures
social effects will be endogenous. To overcome this problem is not easy,
because we have virtually no access to personal information of the net-
work members besides the structure of the network surrounding them.
In this study, we approach this problem by adopting an idea developed in
the area of collaborative filering and recommendation systems: The struc-
ture of the network can be used to infer individual-level characteristics.
That is, we assume the unobserved individual heterogeneity is determined
by a set of latent features of the agents, which also drive them to form
friendships; then, the endogeneity problem can be solved by uncovering
the latent features embedded in the network structure. Specifically, we ap-
ply the machine learning technique nonnegative matrix factorization (Lee
and Seung 1999) to uncover the agents’ latent features from the network
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adjacency matrix and use them in the econometric analysis. As far as we
are aware, we are the first to apply the matrix factorization technique in
economics.
We model a finite and fixed network of rational agents, who can
visit a venue at discrete times. If agents visit the venue, they may send out
a check-in status to their network neighbors. In each period, the perceived
benefit of visiting for a new visitor is a function of the individual’s own
characteristics, the period-specific trend, and also the endorsement ef-
fect of the past check-ins at the venue by her connected social neighbors.
When adopting a seemingly innocent and widely used assumption about
individual behavior — Every neighbor’s endorsement is equal, the social
effect on a potential visitor reduces to the (normalized) number of unique
endorsements received (also the proportion of social neighbors who have
checked-in). Thus our benchmark model to test resembles the so-called
local threshold models in social contagion literature (Morris 2000, Watts
2002).
We conduct our empirical analyses on a unique dataset from a ma-
jor location-based social networking site. We observe both the interper-
sonal connections and the sequential visits to venues (check-ins). In a
sharp contradiction to intuition and theoretical models in the diffusion
literature, we find that, in our benchmark model, the normalized num-
ber of unique endorsements by neighbors is actually not a good predictor
of the likelihood of a new visit. Consider an example in which two non-
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visitors each have 10 friends: One of them receives endorsements from
three friends, and the other receives five. Our result indicates that the one
receiving five endorsements does not necessarily have a higher probabil-
ity to visit the venue, everything else being equal. We suggest that a more
detailed relationship between each connected pair of individuals should
be considered — for example the “proximity” of users implied by the ob-
served connection patterns, an idea that can be traced back to a series of
influential sociological papers (see Granovetter 1978, Burt 1987, Van den
Bulte and Lilien 2001 and Centola and Macy 2007). We show that after
weighting the endorsements by a parsimonious “proximity” measure (see
Granovetter 1973 and Granovetter 1983 in sociology, Liben-Nowell and
Kleinberg 2007 in computer science), the social effect becomes signifi-
cantly positive. This result indicates that the endorsements from different
social neighbors have unequal impacts on a focal user; in particular, the
impact is expected to be larger if the endorsement comes from a “closer”
neighbor. Thus, our work also joins the literature that investigates asym-
metric influential roles that individuals play in a diffusion process (e.g.,
Goldenberg et al. 2009, Nair et al. 2010). However, unlike in the studies
such as “innovative hub” or “opinion leader,” which concern an individ-
ual’s global stature, our finding is an evidence of unequal local, person-
to-person influences. Additionally, we find that repeated check-ins have a
larger effect.
Our findings on the endorsement effect of check-ins shed light on
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the economic value of the location-based social networks, one of the most
popular genres of online community. Consumers spend a great deal of
time and money searching for products and services that meet their tastes
and needs. In many markets, the product space is so large that a complete
search is very costly; thus, the consumers are often unaware of or poorly
informed about a substantial portion of the available choices. For mar-
kets of experience goods, this problem can be especially severe because
consumers are not perfectly certain about their preferences before con-
sumption. Previous literature has suggested that consumers can learn
by observing the choices of others (Bikhchandani et al. 1992). Indeed,
Amazon posts the ranking of purchases in each category of products; Tri-
pAdvisor ranks the popularity of hotels in a certain area. Our finding of a
positive social effect indicates that the check-ins may play a similar role in
facilitating people’s search for venues such as restaurants and nightclubs
by making the observational learning more effective. Furthermore, the
new technology also deviates from the traditional observational learning
paradigm in two important ways. First, it introduces individual identities
and social relationships into the learning process, which is particularly
important for products or services for which great variation exists in peo-
ple’s tastes. In this case, observing the choices of network friends rather
than anonymous others (as is in the case of sales ranking) helps con-
sumers better learn their preferences, because they are likely to know the
“similarity” of their tastes and the tastes of their network friends. Our
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finding of unequal effects of friends’ check-ins support this argument.
Second, in the classic observational learning models, each agent takes an
action only once, and the outcome is unobserved; in our case, one net-
work member can check-in multiple times, implicitly indicating a positive
outcome from earlier visits. In this sense, multiple check-ins resemble the
word-of-mouth effect.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section
3.2, we review the related literature. In Section 3.3, drawing upon earlier
studies, we introduce our individual-decision model, which leads to the
benchmark econometric model in which the effects of friends’ check-ins
are assumed to be equal. In Section 3.4, we describe the dataset, explain
how we discretize the observed history of check-ins, and define the cor-
respondence between the model concepts and data. In Section 3.5, we
first present the result of the benchmark model, which indicates that the
equal-effects assumption fails to capture the structure of the endorse-
ment effect. Drawing upon the work in sociology and computer science,
we show that weighting friends’ check-ins by a proximity measure can
yield a better result. We then test the robustness of the result with alter-
native specifications and also discuss the implication of our finding on the
economic value of the location-based social networks. Lastly, we conclude
and point out potential future research directions.
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3.2 Literature Review
Our work mainly draws on two streams of previous literature: (1)
the literature on innovation/behavior diffusion in a population, and (2)
the literature on matrix-factorization-based recommendation systems in
computer science.
The diffusion of a new product/idea/behavior has been an exten-
sively studied topic in the economics, marketing, and sociology literature.
One of the most important questions in this area is how earlier adoptions,
in different circumstances labeled as social influence or network effect, af-
fect later adoption decisions. It is well known that different micro-level
influence mechanisms lead to completely different cumulative adoption
curves (Chatterjee and Eliashberg 1990, and Young 2009, among others)
and provide different answers to the question of why some new behav-
iors become “viral” (Leskovec et al. 2007), whereas others are confined to
only a small subset of the population (Rogers 1995, Watts 2002). More-
over, with the increasing popularization of online communities and social
media, studying the question also sheds light on identifying network “in-
fluencers” (Kempe et al. 2003), which may potentially guide marketers to
better harness the power of word of mouth (WOM).
Modeling social influence structure can be dated back to the very
early studies on large scale innovation diffusion in a population. These
models, especially the ones developed in the era when only aggregate data
(e.g., total number of adopters, or total numbers of adopters in different
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groups or geographic regions) were available, generally imitate epidemi-
ological models, in which adopters act as “infectors” and non-adopters
constitute the “susceptible” group. “Social contagion” models, so they
are called (Bass 1969, Mahajan et al. 2000 and references therein). For
the most part, aggregate phenomena are the research focus and the pop-
ulation is modeled as more or less amorphous. Without observing the
explicit network among the individuals, an encounter between an adopter
and a susceptible individual is assumed to be random. The adoption “de-
cision” then either deterministically or stochastically depends on only the
global ratio of adopters and non-adopters, which is the classical random
mixing assumption (Granovetter 1978, Van den Bulte and Lilien 1997).
The intensity of social influence or social pressure on individual decisions
about whether or not to adopt therefore boils down to the proportion
of others in the population who have already adopted (which is also the
case in observational learning models; for example, see Bikhchandani et
al. 1992; Young 2009).
Although these models provide many insights about a diffusion
process at the aggregate level (e.g., equilibrium adoption rate, good/bad
herds), most of them deliver little in understanding the fine structure of
person-to-person influence: In the majority of realistic scenarios, people
usually care much more about the decisions made by family and close
friends than by the full population. In recent years, with data that pro-
vide explicit interpersonal relationships becoming more available, diffu-
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sion studies that consider nonrandom social influence patterns have be-
come increasingly popular. Instead of looking at the global ratio of the
already adopted, these studies assume that individuals are influenced not
by all but by only some relatively small number of local influencers (e.g.,
connected social network neighbors). In particular, observing the “real”
network as a graph allows researchers to model and test the finer struc-
ture of social influence. For example, Hill et al. (2006) found that the di-
rect contact with an existing customer increases the adoption likelihood
for a potential telecommunication service customer; using prescription
data, Nair et al. (2010) documented that a research-active specialist, or
“opinion-leader” can influence a physician’s prescription behavior in the
same “reference group;” Katona et al. (2011) studied the sequential adop-
tion of a social networking technology and found that the adoption prob-
ability is positively associated with the number or proportion of adopted
neighbors and with the density of connections among them.
We build our model following this line of “diffusion in a network”
literature and use it to test the effectiveness of the new popular social fea-
tures (in our context check-ins) in influencing individuals’ searching for
products or services that meet their needs (in our context venues). The
lack of individual characteristics makes our empirical analyses vulnerable
to the problem of endogeneity caused by the unobserved heterogeneity.
As mentioned in the introduction, we uncover the individual-level charac-
teristics from the network graph, a method developed in the area of online
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recommendation systems. This area focuses on predicting consumers’ fu-
ture purchases/ratings of products based on the purchase/rating history
and, in some cases, the social relationships between consumers. As a
class of latent factor models, matrix factorization models have recently
emerged as a state-of-art methodology for recommendation systems. The
idea is to derive a “high-quality low-dimensional feature representation”
of users based on analyzing the social network graph matrix (or user-
product matrix) and then use the latent features as the basis for recom-
mendation (Ma et al. 2008, Koren et al. 2009). The methodology’s effec-
tiveness has been proven in various applications, and in particular, the
Netflix competition. The specific technique we use is nonnegative matrix
factorization (NMF), which was popularized by Lee and Seung (1999). Lee
and Seung (2001) analyzed algorithms for computing NMF.
3.3 Model
Since examining social effects is our research goal, we start by in-
troducing the network structure. We assume that the population is a
group of N agents, whose connections/relationships can be described by
a N ×N adjacency matrix G, where the i, j element
gij =
{
1, if i follows (can be influenced by) j
0, otherwise , i, j = 1,2, . . . ,N.
Note that we do not require G be symmetric. However, it can be, for
example, when we are looking at friendships, in which case gij = gji,
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∀i, j. The influencers of an individual i, denoted V(i), are the set of
agents whom i follows, so V(i) = {j|gij = 1}. Similarly, we define the
influencees of agent i to be the set of network members who follow i:
W(i) = {j|gji = 1}. Obviously if G is symmetric, we have V(i) = W(i)
and call them i’s friends.
Agents choose whether or not to visit a venue v . We assume visits
happen in discrete time intervals, indexed by w = 0,1, . . . (we use letter
w to denote time instead of the more conventional t for consistency with
our weekly data, which we describe later). ywi ∈ {0,1} indicates whether
i visits the venue at time w. Facilitated by the social networking tech-
nology, once an agent visits v , she sends a check-in status (also called
an “endorsement” hereafter) to all of her influencees. Call the group of
agents who visited v at time w the w-visitors, denoted by A(w), and who
have not visited v by w − 1 and can potentially visit v at time w the w-
risk set, denoted by R(w). Â(w) = ∪wω=0A(ω) is thus all the visitors up to
time w. Let the binary variable ŷwi = 1 if individual i ∈ Â(w). It is easy
to see that, for an agent i in R(w), the group of people who have sent
her endorsements by time w − 1 is Â(w − 1)∩V(i)— that is, the visitors
among i’s influencers (we also call them i’s visitor-influencers).
We assume that the payoff to agent i in the risk set from taking
action ywi = 1 can be written as:
uwi (y
w
i = 1) = vwi (xi, xw , {A(w − 1),A(w − 2), . . . , A(1),A(0)})− εwi ,
(3.1)
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where vwi is the perceived benefit of visit and ε
w
i is a stochastic distur-
bance/cost independently and identically distributed across both individ-
uals and times.3 vwi is a function of individual characteristics, xi; the
time-specific effect, xw ; and also the past endorsements received from
others, which are determined by V(i) and the visiting history {A(w −
1),A(w − 2), . . . , A(1),A(0)}.4 As usual, we normalize uwi (ywi = 0) = 0,
so i in the risk set visits v at time w if and only if vwi ≥ εwi .
The way by which {A(w − 1),A(w − 2), . . . , A(1),A(0)} affects vwi
captures the social effects. In our benchmark model, we assume that the
social effect can be captured by the (normalized) number of unique en-
dorsements received from influencers, which is also the number of visitor-
influencers divided by the number of the focal individual’s influencers.
This assumption is widely used in the diffusion literature, and it is also
a very natural one in our context because the technology shows to users
the group of friends who have checked-in to the venue. We further write
3εwi includes idiosyncratic shocks, e.g., the difficulty of reserving a seat at the venue
at i’s specific choice of time.
4We model social neighbors’ endorsements as a direct benefit into the individual
preference. We can interpret vi as individual i’s belief or expectation of the benefit
of visiting the venue and the belief may be adjusted according to social neighbors’ en-
dorsements. This kind of social effect is also called “peer influence,” “neighborhood
effect,” and “conformity” in the literature. The assumption that an agent can “remem-
ber” all the past check-ins by friends is based on the fact that the technology allows
the users to see the group of friends who have checked-in previously. In addition, we
do not allow A(w) to affect vwi , so there is no contemporaneous interaction among
individuals.
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vwi as a linear sum (cf. Van den Bulte and Lilien 2001, Valente 2005)








is the social effect. ĝij basically measures how j’s endorsement affects
the benefit for i. In many cases, the researcher observes only the binary
connection patterns, or G, so from a modeler’s point of view, ĝijs should
be based only upon gijs. For js that satisfy gij = 0, ĝijs are naturally
chosen to be 0. For js that gij = 1 — that is, i’s influencers — the form of
ĝij that has been used extensively in earlier models (explicitly or implic-
itly, e.g., Watts 2002 in social network, Katona et al. 2011 in marketing,













gik 6= 0. (3.4)
Here is a numerical example
G =

0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0












0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
 .
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This commonly used specification is straightforward to interpret: Each
agent, no matter how many other network members by whom she is in-
fluenced, puts equal weights on influencers, and the total weights are
normalized to be the same. The value of expression (3.3) ranges from 0 to
1, the same for different individuals. In fact, under modeling choice (3.4),








that is, the proportion of visitors among i’s influencers, or the number
of unique endorsements normalized by the total number of influencers.
Then, equation (3.2) can be rewritten as
vwi = αi + xiβ+ xwγ + δrw−1i . (3.6)
A nonzero δ indicates the existence of social effect.
Such a specification — that is, assuming all influencers are equal,
looks innocent, and seems to be a natural first step approximation, es-
pecially when the number of individuals in consideration is very large
and detailed interactions among them are either unobserved or extremely
hard to record by outside researchers. Indeed, many of the local thresh-
old diffusion models (and social interaction models in which individual
behavior is influenced by the mean behavior in reference peer group) and
some social network analysis techniques — including Google search en-
gine’s famous PageRank (Brin and Page 1998) — are implicitly based on
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such an assumption. However, as we will see in our subsequent empirical
analyses, this seemingly innocent assumption can lead to a quite counter-
intuitive result.
3.4 Data
The dataset we use comes from a major location-based social net-
working website in China. The service is almost always used as a mo-
bile application: It allows registered users to post their location at a
venue (called check-in in the application’s terminology) via their GPS-
enabled mobile devices, typically smart phones, and connect with friends.
A check-in requires verification of users’ GPS data, so it represents a real
visit. Most checked-in places are mainly restaurants, shopping centers,
nightlife sites, and tourist attractions. Friendship is mutual, and thus a
relationship between two friends is undirected (symmetric G). Points are
awarded at check-in, and users can also provide their comments or re-
views when checking-in at a venue. The check-in status, possibly with a
comment or review attached, is then sent to all friends. Users can choose
to have their check-ins posted on other partner social networking sites
such as Sina Weibo, Renren, Douban, and so on.
The dataset includes only a subset of the website’s members, who
were selected by (the company) randomly sampling ids in the population.
To protect the users’ privacy, we were not given their true online-ids, nick-
names, registration dates, or any other demographic information such as
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Time Pseudo-id Location (Encoded)
2010-08-19 03:46:52 1803 EF6260A6EA3463D6
2010-08-19 03:48:22 405 866A6700B769EC89550271D60C131D8F
2010-08-19 03:48:31 2530 5859EE11867F5A6F
Table 3.1: Sample Check-in Data
age, gender, and city. However, we were indeed provided complete data
on friendships among this subset of users. In other words, we know who
are whose friends in our sample. Since a friendship links two users and all
users are equally likely to be in our sample, then the observed friendships
in the dataset are also random. Therefore, we can conclude that the social
network we observe is a representative “sub-network,” and our empirical
study on diffusion in this “sub-network” can shed light on the underlying
diffusion process in the “whole network.”
The other key part of the dataset is the users’ complete history
of check-ins or venue visits. The structure of this part of the dataset is
illustrated in Table 3.1. We observe when who checked-in and where.
Again, for privacy concerns, venue names were encoded into human-
uninterpretable strings. Apart from the string itself, we know neither the
actual geographic location nor the type of the venue (restaurant, shop-
ping center, etc.). However, we do know that a venue was mapped into
only one string.
There are three additional concerns regarding the data. The first
is that, as in many other empirical applications that use online social
network data, we have only one snapshot of the social graph (relation-
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ships between users), whereas in reality the network itself is evolving con-
stantly. Following the tradition in the literature, we also assume that the
observed network at the end of study period contains true “real-life” re-
lationships among users; these “cyber relationships” are not the cause of,
but simply a digital mapping of “real-life” ones.5 The second concern is
that the observed diffusion of check-ins at venues may mix with the unob-
served diffusion of the platform/application itself. This problem could be
especially severe at the very early stage after the application’s introduc-
tion when its user-base grew the fastest in early 2010. To reduce noises
such as this to the largest extent, we choose to focus on venues whose
first appearance in the dataset occurred after September 1, 2010, the lat-
ter half of the check-in history log. By doing so, we implicitly assume
that by then the network operated on this application had entered a rel-
atively stable period and the observed sequential check-ins reflected only
the diffusion of venue visits. Third, we observe the diffusion processes
for multiple venues. When we pool the venues together for econometric
modeling, we need to consider both venue-specific effects and individ-
uals’ heterogeneous tastes towards different venues. Hence, we rewrite
equation (3.6) here
vv,wi = αvi + xiβ+ xv,wγ + δr
v,w−1
i , (3.7)
5We essentially assume away the possibility that user i could friend some user j
whom she had not known in real world, just because they happened to check in the
same place at the same time and then get to know each other through the website. In
this case, the friendship would be the result of online activities.
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where the superscript v means “venue,” and the i-sub-indexed fixed com-
ponent αvi allows heterogeneous tastes and can be interpreted as the
baseline utility i believes that she can get by visiting v .
Time-Independent Covariates
The total number of individuals in the dataset is 28,740. The ob-





j gji) and two other measures of i’s network statures: the
(local) betweenness (sbw,i) and the (local) clustering coefficient (scc,i). They
are the social network analysis (SNA) variables typically used in the diffu-
sion in network literature. Betweenness is a graph-based centrality mea-
sure first introduced in Freeman (1977). Here, we adopt a local version of







which focuses on i’s relative importance as a local brokerage (Burt 2005).6
The local clustering coefficient at node i (Watts and Strogatz 1998, New-






6Katona et al. 2011: “for every unrelated pair of users j, k among i’s friends, the
contribution of the pair j, k to the betweenness of i is inversely proportional to the
number of length-2 paths between j and k.”
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l sbw scc l · scc c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
# of friends l 1.00
betweenness sbw 0.79 1.00
clustering scc 0.03 -0.00 1.00
l · scc 0.37 0.03 0.64 1.00
individual c1 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 1.00
latent c2 -0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.08 -0.21 1.00
features c3 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.21 -0.22 1.00
c4 0.06 -0.00 0.05 0.15 -0.20 -0.22 -0.22 1.00
c5 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.31 -0.33 -0.28 -0.30 1.0000
Table 3.2: Correlation between Time-Independent Covariates and Latent
Features
which measures the interconnectedness/density of relationships among
i’s friends.7 A higher clustering coefficient indicates denser relationships
in the local network. We also include the product of li and scc,i, because
the clustering coefficient decreases quadratically as the size of the net-
work increases while holding the probability of link formation constant.
We do not discuss sbw,i and scc,i more deeply since they are not the focus
of the present research. Interested readers can refer to the lengthy social
network analysis literature. xi in equation (3.7) is thus
xi = (li sbw,i scc,i liscc,i).
These time-independent covariates can be easily computed based on the
network graph G. The correlations between these variables are provided
in the upper left part of Table 3.2.8
7The numerator is the number of links among i’s friends and the denominator is
the maximum number of relationships possible among them.
8In Table 3.2, we drop the sub-index i for cleanness of notation.
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Discretization and Time-Dependent Covariates
We break down the check-in history into non-overlapping weekly
intervals: For each venue v , we denote the timestamp of the earliest
check-in in our history log time 0 (also w = 0), the week immediately
following the first check-in week w = 1, and so on, until we reach the
end of the history. If the last week is not whole, we drop it to avoid any
censoring issue.
For each venue v , in week w, we can then identify the visitors
Av(w). We define the week w risk set of users to be the individuals who
had not visited v by week w −1 and have at least one visitor-friend. Note
that a user could stay in the risk set for multiple weeks; once a user first
checked-in, she would no longer appear in the risk set in the subsequent
weeks. Hence, we focus only on new visitors in this research. Table 3.3
shows the discretized series of the check-in history for two venues. The
third and fourth columns are the number of unique visitors and the total
number of check-ins up to week w −1. The fifth column is the size of the
risk set. The last two columns are the numbers of check-ins in week w
made by risk-set members and the users who were neither already-visitors
nor risk-set members, respectively.
One thing to emphasize here is that we restrict the risk set to con-
tain only visitors’ friends (rather than all users who had not visited the
venue). By doing so, we are not suggesting that the users outside our risk
set have zero probabilities to check-in to the places. They actually did,
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as shown in the last column of Table 3.3. Rather, the primary reason of
this restriction is that we want to focus on the behavior of the subset of
individuals who are more homogeneous: We have a good belief that they
at least “knew” the venue and also were most likely to be “able” to visit
the venue. China is a vast country and the service from which the data
comes was and is used by people living in places, although mostly a hand-
ful of top-tier cities, that can be thousands of miles apart. People living in
the city of Shanghai hardly know those non-landmark venues in the city
of Shenzhen. Indeed, awareness is the very important first step to adopt
a new behavior, and it is traditionally emphasized in the diffusion litera-
ture (Ryan and Gross 1943, Rogers 1995). Moreover, even if individuals
were well informed about all the venues in the country, the check-in cost
would vary hugely across each user-venue pair. To know the users’ demo-
graphics and the venues’ types and geo-locations can certainly help, but
unfortunately we have no access to the information. Thus, we decide to let
the risk set be only the visitors’ friends. First, because of the functional-
ity of the technology, they must have received the visitor-friend’s check-in
status, so we have good confidence that they “knew” this venue. Second,
two friends tend to be geographically and socioeconomically more close
to each other than a pair of random individuals. Thus, a friend of user i
who visited venue v is more likely to live within “feasible” distance to and
be able to afford v . Therefore, the cost of check-in at the venue should be
more homogeneous for the visitors’ friends.
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Technically, the reason for making this restriction is to ensure the
plausibility of our i.i.d. assumption on εwi (equation (3.1)), and, in particu-
lar, the disturbance being uncorrelated with the number of endorsements
received. Without the restriction, as we have argued above, εwi would be
correlated with rw−1i (equation (3.6)). On the other hand, the drawback of
this restriction is that all observations in the subsequent analyses would
have strictly positive rw−1i s, so we would not be able to compare the like-
lihoods of visiting for someone who received endorsements and someone
who did not; we would only compare the likelihoods for people who re-
ceived different numbers of endorsements.
There could exist a weekly-specific trend that monotonically changes
the visiting likelihood. For example, a promotion campaign might take
place at venue v in week w, so everybody’s propensity of visiting it is
likely to increase in week w. If a campaign lasts for multiple weeks, ig-
noring this effect would cause the disturbance to be serially correlated.
Consequently, εv,wi would be correlated with r
v,w−1
i , so the i.i.d. assump-
tion would fail (see similar discussions in Van den Bulte and Lilien 2001,
Nair et al. 2010). One way to solve this problem is to use venue-specific
weekly dummy variables, which obviously would substantially increase
the number of coefficients we have to estimate. The second way, which is
what we do, is to use the number of check-ins made by the users who are
neither already-visitors nor risk-set members (denote the number ov,w ) as
a proxy for the weekly trend. In our examples in Table 3.3, this proxy
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Week Ending Date # of Visitors Total Check-in # in Risk Set Risk C-ins Non-Risk C-ins
w up to w − 1 up to w − 1 in w in w
1 2010-10-04 1 1 73 0 0
2 2010-10-11 1 4 73 11 33
3 2010-10-18 37 51 745 5 0
4 2010-10-25 42 58 775 1 1
5 2010-11-01 44 61 785 1 1
6 2010-11-08 46 63 802 2 0
7 2010-11-15 48 65 832 3 2
8 2010-11-22 53 70 870 6 2
9 2010-11-29 61 78 930 0 0
10 2010-12-06 61 78 930 3 2
11 2010-12-13 65 83 946 13 4
12 2010-12-20 80 104 1227 6 1
13 2010-12-27 84 111 1238 2 2
14 2011-01-03 88 115 1254 0 0
15 2011-01-10 88 115 1254 3 6
16 2011-01-17 97 125 1280 14 5
17 2011-01-24 113 146 1379 0 3
18 2011-01-31 116 150 1395 0 1
19 2011-02-07 117 151 1400 0 0
20 2011-02-14 117 151 1400 2 0
21 2011-02-21 119 153 1399 0 1
9D3ACE0BC12099CC3F1371656A556B38
1 2010-09-30 1 1 27 0 0
2 2010-10-07 1 1 27 0 0
3 2010-10-14 1 1 27 0 0
4 2010-10-21 1 1 27 0 0
5 2010-10-28 1 1 27 0 0
6 2010-11-04 1 1 27 0 1
7 2010-11-11 2 2 32 0 2
8 2010-11-18 4 4 65 2 18
9 2010-11-25 22 24 484 8 5
10 2010-12-02 33 52 642 0 2
11 2010-12-09 35 55 649 11 5
12 2010-12-16 47 78 760 12 5
13 2010-12-23 61 136 847 2 1
14 2010-12-30 64 140 880 2 8
15 2011-01-06 73 155 904 0 2
16 2011-01-13 75 160 905 17 7
17 2011-01-20 97 199 1036 7 4
18 2011-01-27 105 214 1056 0 3
19 2011-02-03 108 217 1062 7 4
20 2011-02-10 117 231 1162 0 2
FF8FF39D7DF75AEBD705EC853A0F7BF4
Table 3.3: Sample Discrete Intervals
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We decide to use a subset of our data because the number of ob-
servations is too large. Even though we have only a moderate number
of website users in the dataset and the size of the risk set (e.g., the fifth
column in Table 3.3) is even smaller because of our restriction, we ob-
serve the diffusion processes for a total of 172,217 venues. For each of
these venues, we also discretize its check-in history into multiple weeks.
Therefore, if we were to include all the venues in the dataset to do the
estimation, the number of observations would exceed 1 billion, which we
cannot handle computationally. To overcome this problem, we choose to
use only the top 50 venues that were checked-in most often in the ob-
served history, which yields us a sample size of 690,896. Since we will
consider both venue-specific effects and heterogeneous tastes of differ-
ent individuals toward the venues, we conclude that using only popular
venues will not cause a selection problem.9 In addition, using popular
9In fact, we have estimated the most important specifications using data of top 100
venues, and two sets of 50 venues selected randomly from top 100. In each case, the
estimates only slightly change. The signs and significance levels of the estimates are
basically the same as reported here. Because of spatial limit, we do not report these
results here.
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venues also supports our assumption that past check-ins by others are
endorsements rather than criticisms.
3.5.1 Results
Our benchmark econometric model analyzed in this section is based
on equations (3.1) and (3.7). Following Bell and Song (2007) and Katona et
al. (2011), we assume εv,wi follows Gumbel distribution, so, after normal-
ization on distributional parameters, the probability that agent i in the
risk set visits venue v in week w is obtained as
P(yv,wi = 1) = 1− exp{− exp(v
v,w
i )}




Thus, it suggests that we use the complementary log-log link function
to estimate the binary choice model. Parameter estimates are obtained
by applying Maximum Likelihood (ML) method and standard errors are
computed to be robust to venue-clustering.
Model 1a in Table 3.410 shows the result of the benchmark model.
It corresponds to equation (3.8), except that for now we ignore the indi-
vidual specific taste, αvi . The most important estimate, coefficient δ, is
shown in the first row. Contrary to the general intuition and previous lit-
erature, we find that δ is significantly negative, while controlling the time
trend and the observed individual network characteristics. If we believe
10*, **, and *** mean 5%, 1%, and 0.1% significance levels, respectively.
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Probability of Visiting Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(z-value) (z-value) (z-value)
Normalized # Unweighted: rw−1i -1.36*** -1.39***
of Endorsements (-12.34) (-11.57)
Weighted: r̂w−1i 2.06*** 2.03***
(29.11) (28.31)
Time Trend Weekly Trend: ow 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(6.18) (5.93) (6.10)
Time-independent N of Friends: li 19.17*** 25.35*** 15.97***
Covariates (1/1,000) (10.33) (15.49) (9.90)
N of Friends2: l2i -0.20*** -0.36*** -0.23***
(1/1,000) (-4.90) (-7.20) (-5.49)
Betweenness: sbw,i 0.29*** 0.60*** 0.38***
(1/1,000) (3.48) (5.99) (4.45)
Clustering: scc,i -0.10 -1.36*** -1.26***
(-0.86) (-12.74) (-10.75)
N × Clustering: liscc,i -0.01 0.08*** 0.05***
(-0.64) (5.28) (3.32)
N of Observations 690,896 690,896 690,896
Pseudo Log-Likelihood -17,145.54 -16,944.26 -16,825,66
Table 3.4: Results of Complementary Log-Log Regressions: Part I, αvi Un-
considered
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Probability of Visiting Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(z-value) (z-value) (z-value)
Normalized # Unweighted: rw−1i -1.00*** -1.06***
of Endorsements (-9.04) (-9.41)
Weighted: r̂w−1i 0.90*** 0.94***
(12.37) (13.00)
Time Trend Weekly Trend: ow 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(6.73) (6.82) (6.83)
Time-independent N of Friends: li 27.80*** 32.07*** 25.09***
Covariates (1/1,000) (11.70) (14.84) (11.62)
N of Friends2: l2i -0.37*** -0.47*** -0.37***
(1/1,000) (-6.62) (-7.67) (-6.70)
Betweenness: sbw,i 0.62*** 0.81*** 0.63***
(1/1,000) (5.43) (6.53) (5.65)
Clustering: scc,i -1.00*** -1.61*** -1.52***
(-8.51) (-15.98) (-13.99)
N × Clustering: liscc,i 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.19***
(9.54) (12.60) (11.63)
N of Observations 690,896 690,896 690,896
Pseudo Log-Likelihood -15,937.43 -15,931.93 -15,871.34
Table 3.5: Results of Complementary Log-Log Regressions: Part II, αvi
Considered
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that the social effect of friends’ endorsements should be either zero (no
effect) or on aggregate positive, considering the fact that we select popular
venues, then two explanations exist for the counterintuitive negative sign
of the δ coefficient: (1) Because of omitting the unobserved fixed effect αvi ,
our econometric model is misspecified and hence produces an incorrect
result; or (2) treating every friend’s endorsement as the same (equation
(3.4)), the assumption that leads to regression model (3.8), is implausible
in capturing the structure of the social effect of past check-ins. We are go-
ing to explore both of the two possibilities, propose solutions, and report
the new results in the other columns in Table 3.4 and 3.5.
Endogeneity. To see why leaving out the heterogeneous tastes αvi
invalidates the econometric model (see Nair et al. 2010 for a discussion
on physician-specific effect on prescription adoption), recall that an in-
dividual may stay in the risk set for multiple weeks. Particularly, the
individuals who have lower values of αvi are likely to remain for a longer
time period. Indeed, a user who believes that she will dislike a venue very
much (extremely low αvi ) may never visit the venue, no matter how many
of her neighbors have already visited there and sent her endorsements.
Furthermore, it is not hard to see that, for a user i staying in the risk
set for multiple weeks, the number of endorsements received by i can
only increase as time goes by. Therefore, mathematically, αvi and r
v,w−1
i
are negatively correlated. Leaving the unobserved αvi into the disturbance
causes the estimates to be inconsistent. A high rv,w−1i may simply pick up
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the effect of a low αvi , yielding a negative coefficient. Another aspect of
the endogeneity problem is related to the phenomenon of homophily: the
tendency of individuals to associate and bond with similar others. One
may think that two friends are likely to have similar tastes (in our context
positively correlated αvi ) than a pair of random individuals. Therefore, α
v
i
could be (positively) correlated with rv,w−1i . Thus, the identification of the
social effect is complicated by the unobservability of αvi .
To solve the endogeneity problem is difficult, because the unob-
served heterogeneity is not individual-specific, but individual-venue spe-
cific: Different people have different tastes toward different venues. Hence
this problem cannot be solved by using dummy variables. Technically, it
resembles a panel/clustered data binary choice model with heterogene-
ity, where the fixed effect is correlated with some observed covariates
(Wooldrige 2001). Here, we innovate to use a machine learning technique
to deal with this problem.
Nonnegative Matrix Factorization (NMF). The endogeneity prob-
lem is caused by the unobservability of heterogeneity αvi . Statistical meth-
ods that deal with this problem typically assume certain probabilistic dis-
tribution for αvi .11 The approach we explore in this subsection is to find
11One existing modeling alternative provided in the econometrics literature is to
specify how αvi probabilistically relates to the observed covariates. One example is
Chamberlain’s correlated random effects specification (Chamberlain 1980; Mundlak
1978), which imposes the assumption that the unobserved heterogeneity conditional
on the mean of observed covariates follows normal distribution.
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a set of individual-level “latent factors” that determine αvi by factorizing
the adjacency matrix G.
The idea originates from researchers in computer science who de-
sign and implement online recommendation systems that use network
graph data to predict products that users might be interested in. The key
assumption underlying their method is that the relationships between the
users and the users’ preferences toward the products are simultaneously
induced by some hidden lower-dimensional feature space (Ma et al. 2008).
Under this assumption, even though individuals’ preferences, in our case
αvi , are unobserved, they can be learned by factorizing the observed net-
work graph, in our case G.
We adopt the idea here. αvi is baseline utility user i believes she
can obtain by visiting v . We assume it to be
αvi = θv0 + θv1 ci1 + θv2 ci2 + . . .+ θvKciK, (3.9)
where {ci1, ci2, . . . , ciK} are i’s latent characteristics, and {θv0 , θv1 , θv2 , . . . , θvK}
are parameters. So the individual-venue-specific αvi is modeled as the
inner-product of the individual-specific ci vector and the venue-specific
θv vector. The vectors of latent features (the ci vectors) are going to be
uncovered by factorizing the social network graph matrix, and the vectors
of parameters (the θv vectors) are to be estimated in regression.
We use the technique NMF to uncover the cis. Originally developed
by Lee and Seung (1999) for image processing, NMF is popularized in the
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area of recommendation systems. Mathematically, the adjacency matrix G
is approximated by the product of a pair of matrices C (dimension N ×K)
and H (dimension K ×N):
G ≈ C ·H,
where neither of C and H are allowed to have negative elements and K is
typically chosen to be much smaller thanN . The non-negativity constraint
leads to an interpretation that, in row i, elements cik, k ∈ {1,2, . . . , K}
is i’s loading in the kth “community” or “interest group” (Zhang et al.
2007). Then the preference of each individual may be viewed as being
a composition of prototypical preferences in clusters of users bound by
interests or community.
Operationally, we choose K to be five12. The computation is car-
ried out by applying the standard procedures in Lee and Seung (1999).
The correlations among these ciks and between ciks and the other time-
independent covariates are also shown in Table 3.2. Model 1b in Table 3.5
shows the new result when we control the unobserved heterogeneity by
including the ciks and allowing their slopes to be different across venues.
Comparing it with model 1a, we find that although the magnitude and
the z-score decrease as expected, the δ coefficient is still estimated to be
significantly negative with the 99.9% confidence level.
12It is a tradeoff between richness of information and heaviness of computation task.
We also tried K ≤ 10, and the key results did not change.
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Weighting by Proximity. As was mentioned earlier in the sec-
tion, an alternative explanation of the surprising result of a negative δ
is that the widely followed assumption that a potential visitor weighting
all friends’ endorsements equally is not a satisfactory modeling choice.
The sociological branch of the innovation diffusion literature has
long pointed out the need of weighting person-to-person influences ac-
cording to the specific relationships. Granovetter (1978) cautioned that
friends’ roles might be important in forming collective behavior, saying
“the influence any given person has on one’s behavior may depend upon
the relationship.” Burt (1987), in studying medical innovation, formally
defined a weight wji to be “the extent to which person i defines the social
frame of reference for i’s evaluation” (p. 1295). Even though here we nar-
row our attention to only friends, a close friend’s endorsement may still
insert a greater influence than a relatively distant one.
Hence, we explore weighting the endorsements by their senders’
“proximity” to the focal individual. If we had more data about user in-
teractions (e.g., online conversations), we would be able to measure the
proximity of two users by looking at the frequency and intensity of their
interactions. However, we observe only the binary connection patterns,
so whatever proximity measure we use should be inferred from the ad-
jacency matrix G. Counting the graphic distances between nodes does
not apply here, because all influencers, being friends by definition, have
a graphic distance of one to the potential visitor. Instead, we compare
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social neighborhoods to infer the closeness between two persons. The
proximity between user i and user j is measured by the number of users
who are friends of both i and j, divided by the number of users who are
friends of either i or j. Mathematically,





where the interchangeability of i and j, and V and W results from the
symmetry of G. This measure is usually called common neighbors prox-
imity measure, and is widely used in social network analysis and link pre-
diction literature (Liben-Nowell and Kleinberg 2007). The measure origi-
nates from the sociology concept of the strength of the personal tie: The
stronger two persons’ social tie is, the larger the overlap of their friend-
ship circles (Granovetter 1973).
Adopting this proximity measure, we let the weight of j’s endorse-
ment, from the perspective of user i, be proportional to pij . Then, ĝij in







gikpik 6= 0. (3.11)
The denominator is the sum of proximity over all influencers, so it still
holds that the total weights on influencers is the same across the individ-
uals. With (3.11), the social effect now is captured by a new “weighted”









r̂v,w−1i , as is r
v,w−1
i , is in range [0,1]. We include r̂
v,w−1
i into the regres-
sion model and the estimation results are shown in the second (using




i ) columns in Tables
3.4 and 3.5. Again the a models in Table 3.4 are the ones in which the
unobserved heterogeneity is left in the disturbance, and the b models in
Table 3.5 are the ones in which we include individuals’ latent features.
Comparing the results of models 1b, 2b, and 3b (which is also
true for 1a, 2a, and 3a), we find that the coefficient of the weighted
number of endorsements is estimated to be positive at the 0.1% signif-
icance level. Moreover, the absolute value of z-score is larger for the
proximity-weighted number than for the unweighted number, and the
pseudo-likelihood is also larger in model 2b(a) than in model 1b(a). This
result, we hence conclude, supports that the proximity-weighted number
of endorsements is a better predictor of the likelihood of visiting. Us-
ing the model 2b estimates and evaluating the covariates at their median
values, we find that increasing r̂w−1i from 10% to 20% causes the visiting
probability to increase from 0.240% to 0.266%, a 10.8% change in percent-
age.
Across all models, we find consistent support for a positive weekly-
specific effect — a trend proxied by the number of venue-visits by the
users who are neither already visitors nor risk-set members. All of the
time-independent covariates that measure a user’s network stature are
found to be significant with the 99.9% confidence level. Specifically, we
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find a non-monotone number-of-friends effect, although for most of our
observations, the result indicates a higher likelihood of visiting for an in-
dividual with more connections. The coefficient of the betweenness mea-
sure is also positive, meaning that individuals acting as a local bridge
between communities are more likely to visit the venue, everything else
being equal. As is expected, the signs of scc,i and liscc,i are estimated to
be opposite in Table 3.5.
3.5.2 Robustness
In this subsection, we deviate from equation (3.8) to check the ro-
bustness of our result on r̂v,w−1i .
Venue-by-Venue Estimation. By pooling the venues to estimate
equation (3.8), we implicitly assume that the parameters β, γ, and δ are
the same for different venues. To show that our results on r and r̂ are not
driven by only a small number of venues in our sample, we now relax this
restriction and estimate the model venue by venue, allowing β, γ, and in
particular δ to vary across venues. As in Table 3.5, we include individuals’
latent features to capture αvi .
In each of the two plots in Figure 3.1,13 we show the 50 z-values of
the estimate of δ, the coefficient of rv,w−1i (upper plot) or r̂
v,w−1
i (lower
13Again we have tried K ∈ {3,4, . . . ,10}, the dimension of the latent feature space. In
Figure 3.1, we only report the case K = 5. The systematic difference we want to show






































Figure 3.1: z-values of Coefficient δ: r vs. r̂ , Venue-by-Venue Estimation
96
plot), corresponding to the 50 venues in our sample. The dashed line is
at ±1.64, corresponding to the 90% confidence level; the solid line is at
±1.96, corresponding to the 95% confidence level. We find no evidence
of a positive social effect in the upper plot, where we use the unweighted
rv,w−1i : 36 of the estimates are insignificant at the 90% confidence level;
only one z-value is greater than 1.64; the remaining 13 are smaller than
-1.64. However, in the lower plot, where we use the proximity-weighted
r̂v,w−1i , none is significantly negative and about a half (23) are positive at
the 10% significance level, among which 17 are significant at the 5% level.
Thus, the systematic difference shows that our result is not driven by a
small number of “abnormal” venues.
Repetition Effect and More Influence Variables. By using r̂v,w−1i
to capture the effect of the whole history of friends’ past check-ins, we
ignore the fact that a visitor-friend can check-in a venue multiple times.
Presumably, that a visitor-friend checks-in more than once indicates pos-
itive outcomes from her earlier visits and represents a stronger endorse-
ment to the venue. We call this effect the repetition effect. Additionally,
although r̂v,w−1i incorporates the local unequal, person-to-person influ-
ences, we do not take into account the visitor-friends’ different network
statures, which may also lead to different endorsement effects. In this
subsection, we extend our regression model by including more variables
into equation (3.8) as additive components to test the existence of these
effects and the robustness of our key result on the coefficient of r̂v,w−1i .
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These additional variables are the total number of check-ins made
by friends up to week w − 1 (repetition effect, mv,w−1i ), the density of
friendships among visitor-friends (clustering effect, cv,w−1i ), the product of
the number of visitor-friends and clustering effect (av,w−1i c
v,w−1
i ), and also
the average number of friends, the average betweenness and the average
clustering coefficient of the visitor-friends. Many of the variables that
characterize the influencers’ network statures have been discussed and
used in Katona et al. (2011). Four different specifications (using either
a subset or all of the additional variables) are estimated, and the results
are reported in Table 3.6. Again the link function is the complementary
log-log function, and standard errors are computed to be robust to venue-
clustering. Unobserved heterogeneity is dealt with in the same way as in
the models in Table 3.5.
The coefficient of our primary interest, δ, stays significantly posi-
tive. The magnitudes of these estimates in Table 3.6 decrease significantly
from Table 3.5, indicating a high correlation between r̂w−1i and the addi-
tional variables that measure the repetition effect and the effects of the
visitor-friends’ network statures. Across models 4, 6, and 7, we observe
a significantly positive repetition effect: More check-ins or endorsements
made by friends increase the likelihood of visiting, while holding the num-
ber of unique visitor-friends constant. Thus, it is consistent with our in-
tuition that multiple check-ins indicate positive outcomes, resembling a
word-of-mouth effect. In model 6, we find an interesting but slightly coun-
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Probability of Visiting Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(z-value) (z-value) (z-value) (z-value)
Normalized # Weighted: r̂w−1i 0.81*** 0.23** 0.17* 0.18*
of Endorsements (11.35) (2.76) (2.03) (2.14)
Time Trend Weekly Trend: ow 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02***
(7.10) (7.33) (7.33) (7.34)
Time-independent N of Friends: li 28.93*** 17.25*** 17.42*** 17.17***
Covariates (1/1,000) (14.38) (8.52) (8.46) (8.45)
N of Friends2: l2i -0.45*** -0.30*** -0.32*** -0.31***
(1/1,000) (-7.35) (-6.03) (-6.16) (-6.20)
Betweenness: sbw,i 0.78*** 0.54*** 0.57*** 0.56***
(1/1,000) (6.28) (5.05) (5.22) (5.24)
Clustering: scc,i -1.60*** -1.00*** -0.96*** -0.96***
(-15.64) (-8.69) (-8.29) (-8.06)
N × Clustering: liscc,i 0.21*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.14***
(13.01) (6.38) (6.70) (6.74)
Additional Total check-ins: mw−1i 5.82*** 3.13 3.45* 3.42*
Variables (1/1,000) (4.72) (1.85) (2.03) (2.04)
Clustering: cw−1i -1.50*** -1.50*** -1.49***
(-13.30) (-13.17) (-13.11)
D × Clustering: 0.43*** 0.45*** 0.44***
aw−1i c
w−1
i (6.60) (6.78) (6.61)






N of Observations 690,896 690,896 690,896 690,896
Pseudo Log-Likelihood -15,905.49 -15,666.20 -15,644.89 -15,635.67
Table 3.6: Results of Complementary Log-Log Regressions: Part III
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terintuitive result: The coefficient of the average number of friends for the
group of visitor-friends is negative with the 99.9% confidence level, mean-
ing that individuals with more connections have less influential power on
a particular neighbor. A similar result is also reported in Katona et al.
(2011). However, when we include the average betweenness and the aver-
age clustering coefficient (model 7), the coefficient of the average number
of friends becomes insignificant.
One of our findings that contradicts Katona et al. (2011) is that
the clustering effect is estimated to be significantly negative in all spec-
ifications. To interpret this result, a graphic example is given in Figure
3.2. Potential visitors i and j both belong to three communities. In both
cases, three friends (red/filled nodes) have sent endorsements. The influ-
encers are otherwise identical except that in the i case, the three belong
to three different communities, and in the j case, all of the three belong
to one same community. Therefore, in the j case, the visitor-friends are
more clustered. Note that both the unweighted and weighted number of
endorsements (rw−1i and r̂
w−1
i ) are the same in the two cases. Our result
predicts that i is more likely to adopt. Our interpretation is that when a
new behavior is confined to a highly intra-connected community, it might
impede the outsiders from adopting it (Burt 2005). An individual, such
as i, has a higher likelihood to adopt a new behavior when she can learn
about the behavior from more diverse sources.
100
i j
Figure 3.2: An Illustration of Negative Clustering Effect
3.5.3 Implications
Using the location-based social network as our context, we find that
earlier check-ins, as a kind of weak endorsement from friends, have a sig-
nificant social effect on network neighbors’ decisions of visiting a venue.
Our work sheds light on the economic value of the location-based social
networks, one of the most popular genres of online community. Con-
sumers spend a great deal of time and money searching for products and
services that meet their tastes and needs. In many markets, the product
space is so large that a complete search is very costly; thus the consumers
are often unaware of or are poorly informed about a substantial portion of
the available choices. For markets of experience goods, this problem can
be especially severe because consumers are not perfectly certain about
their preferences before consumption. We argue that these new technolo-
gies facilitate people’s search for venues, such as restaurants and night-
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clubs, by allowing them to conveniently observe and learn from network
neighbors’ choices. Our finding serves as evidence that advocates the de-
velopment of the recently-emerged social features and their integration
with traditional business models. Better utilizing these new social fea-
tures, businesses may to a certain extent access a larger customer-base
with lower costs. Unlike much previous research on individual adoption
in an electronic setting (e.g., downloading software from the Internet in
Duan et al. 2009) in which the influence variable is usually the total num-
ber of previous adopters, we look at the finer structure of personal re-
lationships. From the observational learning perspective, the finding of
unequal social effects of the friends’ endorsements indicates that indi-
viduals tend to learn from more closely related social neighbors. This
kind of learning is socially beneficial if the “similarity” of individuals’ pri-
vate valuations of the activity is positively correlated with their proximity.
Otherwise, learning from closely-related neighbors will produce subopti-
mal outcomes and, presumably, cause the network to restructure. More-
over, the weights on endorsements are constructed according to proxim-
ity, which in turn is measured by the strength of the social tie between
individuals. Hence, our result also sheds light on the different roles that
strong and weak ties play in a social network: Although weak ties — span-
ning long distance and bridging tightly-knit groups of people into a “small
world” — are very powerful to convey awareness of new things (Granovet-
ter 1973), strong ties are often more important in carrying trust (Bapna et
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al. 2012), and influencing and shaping certain new behavior (Centola and
Macy 2007).
An ongoing trend in the domain of Internet search is to incorporate
individual identity and social relationships into the methodology that de-
termines search results. Microsoft’s Bing has recently introduced the so-
called “social search” feature, which displays a personalized list of Face-
book friends’ “likes” side by side with the generic, organic list. For ex-
ample, when a Bing user types in a query “restaurants in Austin, TX,” in
addition to a list of popular restaurants in the city based on the wisdom of
the crowd, she may also see a second, personalized list, generated based
on her Facebook friends’ “likes.” Then the question arises: How should
the friends’ “likes” be ranked? Our finding of unequal local influences sug-
gests that the effectiveness of the social search results may be improved
by incorporating the proximity of individuals into the ranking algorithm
— for example, weighting each friend’s “like” by his proximity to the fo-
cal user. For marketers who want to harness the power of the new social
technologies, our finding also has a clear implication: The proximity of
users should be taken into account when using statistical models to opti-
mize marketing effort. Admittedly, more data about detailed interactions
among individuals should always be helpful. However, our result shows
that, when obtaining additional data is too costly, mining out information
about proximity and common interests embedded in simple binary con-
nections can prove to be fruitful as well. Moreover, our results on the
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effects of a potential adopter’s own betweenness and the level of influ-
encers’ clustering also have important implications for the allocation of
marketing effort by firms. If possible, marketing activity should be best
targeted at a group of diverse, well-connected individuals who play im-
portant local brokerage roles. Not only do they have a greater likelihood
to adopt, but the diverse influencing structure created can potentially in-
crease the overall adoption rate, through a larger multiplier effect.
3.6 Conclusion
In the context of location-based social networks, we studied the mi-
cro structure of the endorsement effect of network neighbors’ check-ins.
We specified our model at the individual level. Heterogeneous rational
agents make decisions on whether or not to visit a venue. The perceived
utility of visiting is allowed to be affected by their social network neigh-
bors’ check-ins. The modeling assumption that a potential visitor puts
equal weights on her social neighbors reduces the social effect to a single
measure, the normalized number of unique endorsements received. Our
empirical results show that this number is a bad predictor of the likeli-
hood of visiting, a result that contradicts both the intuition and early the-
oretical models in the diffusion literature. This result, although it might
be a special case pertaining to our dataset, suggests that in modeling the
social effect, even when the researchers observe only the binary connec-
tion patterns among individuals, treating every neighbor’s influence as
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the same can be a dangerous modeling choice. We suggested that a more
detailed relationship between each connected pair be considered — for
example, the “proximity” of users implied by the observed connection
patterns. We showed that weighting the influencers by a parsimonious
proximity measure can yield a more accurate result. The weighted num-
ber of endorsements better captures the structure of the social effect.
Thus, our result supports the tradition in sociology literature that person-
to-person relationships should be examined deeply and modeled differ-
ently in studying individual adoption. Our findings also shed light on the
economic value of the popular location-based social networks. We argue
that these new technologies facilitate people’s search for venues, such as
restaurants and nightclubs, by allowing them to conveniently observe and
learn from network neighbors’ choices, and our finding serves as evidence
that advocates their development and other recently-emerged similar so-
cial features and their integration with traditional business models. In
dealing with the endogeneity problem caused by unobserved heterogene-
ity, we innovatively applied the machine learning technique nonnegative
matrix factorization to uncover the agents’ latent features to proxy the
fixed effect. Again, this suggests that marketers should dig more deeply
into the network graph, when obtaining more data is too costly.
Our study has a number of limitations. First, as we discussed in
the data section, we had only one snapshot of the social network graph,
and we assumed it to be fixed over the period of study. If some of the
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relevant friendships were formed after the venue-visits were made, then
noises would exist in the computation of the time-independent covari-
ates and the measurement of the number of endorsements. Second, we
also equated the number of reported visits (check-ins) with the number of
“true” total visits, implicitly assuming whether or not a visitor checks-in
is random. There are indeed many arguments the reader can employ to
dispute this assumption. However, even if the assumption weren’t valid,
it would not cause a severe problem. After all, we can simply redefine the
new behavior to be “visit plus check-in” rather than just “visit.” Third,
we did not observe any demographic characteristics of the users or infor-
mation about the venues, which undoubtedly limits our ability to better
model the cost of venue-visits and construct more influence measures.
Fourth, we did not observe the types of the venues. It would be interest-
ing to investigate whether a systematic difference exists in the structure
of the social effects for different types of venues (e.g., restaurants vs.
shopping centers). Fifth, we focused only on the endorsements’ effect
on new visitors. One interesting direction for future research would be
to examine whether and how the social effect on already-visitors would
differ. Lastly, in modeling user behavior, we did not consider strategic




A Graph Based Network Influence Measure
4.1 Introduction
We investigate the measurement of individuals’ network influence
by modeling their adoption decision-making in the presence of a social
network. Individuals’ adoption of a certain new product, idea, or behavior
is one of the most commonly observed phenomena in social networks.
For example, users of social broadcasting networks decide whether to use
a “hashtag” in their posts; members of location-based social networks de-
cide whether to “check-in” a particular venue. In making these adoption
decisions, people may be affected by the choices of their social network
neighbors, because of reasons such as social conformity, network exter-
nality, observational learning, and word of mouth. One user’s adoption
may exist only as an isolated event, or it may cause a large subsequent
cascade of adoptions by others. In this chapter, we consider an individual
“influential” if a change in her own state is expected to have a significant
effect on the overall outcome in the network. Based on this definition,
we propose a model-based network influence measure. As is the case in
the preceding two chapters, we assume that we do not observe any in-
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dividual (demographic or socioeconomic) characteristics. Therefore, the
influence measure is purely based upon the social network structure, i.e.,
the (binary) network graph matrix.
Conceptually, a model-based method of scoring social network mem-
bers in terms of their influence can serve as a foundation to characterize
the distribution of influential power among the population and answer
interesting questions such as given the structure of a network, whether
the influential power is concentrated to a relatively small set of individ-
uals or shared by a large proportion of the population. Perhaps more
importantly, a well-founded ranking method can prove to be useful for
practitioners to solve several critical problems in related areas such as
advertising and search. For example, the current practice in targeted
advertising focuses on the consumers’ demographic (e.g., gender) and
socioeconomic (e.g., income) characteristics. In the presence of a social
network where consumers interact and potentially influence each other,
it has been recognized that the targeted individuals’ network positions
should also be taken into account, in order to maximize the effect of
a marketing effort (Kempe et al. 2003). Related, from the network op-
erators’ perspective, a methodology of scoring and ranking the network
members’ influence is important for designing a better pricing scheme
for their advertising products. For example, Facebook allows businesses
to promote their pages or products by highlighting stories authored by
Facebook users about their consumption experiences at the businesses —
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so called sponsored stories in the Facebook terminology. Theoretically,
everything else being equal, the overall effects of two sponsored stories
could be very different if the story authors’ network positions are differ-
ent. Thus, story authors’ network influence should be an important factor
in determining the price of sponsored stories. In the domain of Internet
search, an ongoing trend is to incorporate the information of individual
identity and social relationships into the algorithm that determines search
results. For instance, Bing, developed and operated by Microsoft, has re-
cently introduced the so-called “social search”, which displays a personal-
ized list of Facebook friends’ “likes” side by side with the generic, organic
list.1 Google, the top player in the search domain, has employed a similar
strategy, called “search plus your world,” by promoting its homegrown
social network, Google+, and integrating it with Google Search and other
products. In light of this change, an influence measure can potentially be
used in ranking the social search results, and may even shed light on how
to better integrate them with the existing, organic results.
Sociology researchers have developed several methods of measur-
ing the “importance” of members in a network. The earliest and the sim-
plest measure is degree centrality, which is defined as the number of links
(or in-links in a directed graph) a node has. For example, in the Facebook
network it is the number of friends a user is connected to and on Twitter
it is the number of followers a user has. For the purpose of measuring
1http://www.bing.com/new?publ=BNPHP&crea=HSC.
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influence, the degree centrality is perhaps too simple since (1) it does not
embody the transitivity of influence and (2) it treats every connection or
follower as the same. In fact, using data of online social networks, em-
pirical researchers have found that great popularity does not necessarily
lead to high influence (e.g., Bakshy et al. 2011). As a generalization of
degree centrality, Katz centrality (Katz 1953) counts not only the number
of immediately connected nodes, but also nodes that can be connected
through a path, with the contribution of each node decreasing exponen-
tially with its distance to the focal node. However, Katz centrality still
treats the nodes that are equally distant to the focal node as the same.
This is not satisfactory because, for example, in Chapter Two we find that
in the Twitter context each follower’s “attention” to the focal user decays
as the follower’s number of followings increases. This finding suggests
that in addition to the graphic distance to the focal node, the connected
nodes’ other social network characteristics, such as the number of out-
links, should also be considered in building a model for measuring in-
fluence. Betweenness, first proposed in Freeman (1977), measures the
likelihood that a node appears on a randomly chosen shortest path be-
tween two randomly chosen nodes. The idea is that the communication
between two persons in a social network is likely to happen along the
shortest path between them, and the individuals located on the shortest
path have a great “power” of controlling the communication. While these
graph-based measures are intuitive and easy to implement, they all lack a
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well-defined behavioral foundation: After all, influence means the ability
to affect others’ decision making.
A related area in computer science is the ranking of webpages in
the World Wide Web (www). Kleinberg (1998) proposed a model by ob-
serving that, with respect to a certain topic, two types of webpages gen-
erally exist: authorities, the webpages that provide quality and authorita-
tive information on the topic, and hubs, the webpages that have out-links
to many authorities. He developed an algorithm that identifies the two
types of pages simultaneously and iteratively scores the relevant web-
pages as an authority and as a hub. He proved that the authority and hub
scores converge to their respective limits and suggested the limiting au-
thority scores be used to rank the webpages. To tackle the same problem,
Brin and Page (1998) proposed a model without the distinction between
hubs and authorities. In their model, the “quantity of the authority” of
a webpage is partly passed onto other out-linked webpages and partly
distributed uniformly to the whole www. They showed that an equilib-
rium of the authority distribution exists and the resulting method is the
famous PageRank algorithm, based on which the Google search engine op-
erates. Since the PageRank algorithm relies only on the link relationships
between the webpages, i.e. the graph structure, it can also be applied to
the social network context. Indeed, Google has apparently adapted it to
the problem of ranking social network users and filed a patent application
(Green 2008). Weng et al. (2010) suggested applying PageRank to measure
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Twitter users’ influence. Later in this chapter, we discuss the connection
between our measure of influence and the PageRank algorithm.
We organize the rest of this chapter as follows. We start from a
parsimonious probabilistic model of individual behavior in Section 4.2,
taking into account the local, person-to-person influence, as is the case in
Chapter Three. We then develop the model and show how the person-
to-person influences aggregate to the global, network-level influence. In
Section 4.3, we show that our measure of influence admits the famous
PageRank measure as a special case. In Section 4.4 we conduct numeri-
cal experiments by simulating Watts-Strogatz networks and the goal is to
demonstrate that the higher degree of freedom of our measure enables
it to capture a potentially richer structure of the influence distribution
among a population. Lastly, in Section 4.5, we conclude and point out
future research directions.
4.2 Model
Suppose that a certain act (e.g., choosing a hotel, going to a new
restaurant, purchasing an innovative device, spreading a piece of infor-
mational content) can be adopted by the members of a social network.
The binary outcome, denoted yi = 1 or 0, indicates whether the act is
taken by member i, i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N}, where N is the size of the network.
We assume that the influence relationships among the network
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members are observed. The basic influence structure, corresponding to
the topic of interest, can be represented by an N × N network influence
matrix G. The elements of G are specified as follows:
gij =
{
1, if there is a directed link from i to j;
0, otherwise, i, j = 1,2, . . . ,N.
gij indicates whether or not member j can influence i on the act of inter-
est. G does not have to be symmetric, since the influence relationship can
be nonreciprocal. We write V(i) = {j|gij = 1}, the influencers of i; and
W(i) = {j|gji = 1}, the influencees of i. In practice, the influence matrix
G should be constructed according to the specific act in consideration and
not necessarily coincide with the network adjacency matrix derived from
the actual “friendships” or “following-follower relationships.”2
We adapt Richardson and Domingos (2002)’s model of viral market-
ing to formulate a parsimonious probabilistic model of individual adop-
tions. Suppose that, from the perspective of the researchers, there exists
a baseline probability for member i to take the act, i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N}. We
also call this baseline probability the internal probability, since it would
be the likelihood of i adopting the act if i lived in isolation. We allow the
internal probability to vary across the individuals to take into account the
fact that they could possess heterogeneous characteristics that are related
to adopting the act, but cannot be captured by the network structure (e.g.,
2So ideally, even for the same group of individuals, when we consider different acts,
the corresponding influence matrices should be different.
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the individual-level demographic or socioeconomic characteristics used in
binary choice econometric models), and also that they might be informed
differently about the act (e.g., different prior knowledge sets, different lev-
els of ad exposure). These factors are unobserved by the researchers, so
we use a single parameter p0i to capture the internal probability.
In the presence of a social network, i’s decision may be affected
by her influencers, through the mechanisms such as social conformity,
network externality, observational learning, word of mouth, and so on. We
abstract away from these specific micro-level mechanisms, and assume
that i’s influencers’ acts yjs, j ∈ V(i), affect the probability that i adopts
through a moderating function δij — that is, δij determines the structure
of the local, person-to-person influence. The primitive δij is indexed by
both i and j, so the person-to-person influence can vary across different
pairs of individuals. We further assume that the external influence to be
an additive component in the adoption likelihood function. To sum up,
the key assumption of the network members’ adopting behavior is given
by the following conditional probability equation
p(yi = 1|y−i) = p(yi = 1|yj, j = 1,2, . . . ,N, j 6= i)
= p(yi = 1|yj, j ∈ V(i))





where β and 1− β are the relative weights network members put on their
internal probability and the external influence. To be complete, we also
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so that equation (4.1), as a probability, is always well-defined.
To obtain the unconditional probability of adoption, we take expec-
tations on both the sides of equation (4.1). Note that the expectation is
taken with respect to y−i, which is a random vector from the researchers’
perspective. Then we have




=βp0i + (1− β)
N∑
j=1
gij[δij(1)p(yj = 1)+ δij(0)(1− p(yj = 1))]







gij(δij(1)− δij(0))p(yj = 1),∀i.
For simplicity of notation, we write
pi = p(yi = 1), δ̄ij = δij(0), δij = δij(1)− δij(0).
Hence, the p(yi = 1) equation becomes
pi = βp0i + (1− β)
N∑
j=1




So the unconditional probability for i to adopt the act is determined by
other network members’ unconditional probabilities as well as her inter-
nal probability. Note that gij is determined by the influence structure, so
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once we have chosen the behavioral primitives β and δij(·), the second
term on the right hand side of equation (4.2) is just an i-specific constant,
which without loss of generality can be absorbed into βp0i . Now suppose
p0i can be somehow changed (e.g., through targeted advertising), and we
examine how it would affect the outcome of the whole system. Replacing
the subscript i with k in equation (4.2) and taking the partial derivative of


















Thus, (4.3) is a system of equations that determine the relationships among
the ∂pi∂pj s. Because of the additive form of equation (4.1), the system does
not depend on the p0s. Note that even if individual k is not directly influ-
enced by i (gki = 0), a change of p0i can still cause pk to change as long as
some of the gkjδkj
∂pj
∂p0i
s are nonzero. The transitivity of influence is hence
taken into account in this model.
At the aggregate level, the total number of adopters is S =
∑N
i=1yi,
whose expectation, E(S), equals
∑N









thus measures how a small change in member i’s internal probability
would affect the expected total number of adopters in the whole network
and we define it to be our measure of network influence. Since equation
(4.3) does not depend on p0i s, the NI measure, as is defined by (4.4), is
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also independent of p0s. It can be computed based only upon the influ-
ence structure (gijs) and the behavioral primitives (β and δijs).
Another interpretation of the behavioral primitive δij is the weight
that individual i attaches to j’s influence, j ∈ V(i), which is unobserved
to the researchers. Yet, its specification is important in determining NI.
As we have found in the previous two chapters, the strength of the re-
lationship between two individuals, or the proximity between them, can
have an important moderating effect on the person-to-person influence.
In Chapter Two, we found that in information diffusion, voluntary content
sharing happens more frequently through weak ties; by contrast, in Chap-
ter Three we found in new behavior diffusion — for example, venue visits
— strong ties carry larger social effects. Therefore, we believe δij should
be left as a free parameter in the NI measure. In practice, the researchers
should specify δij carefully according to the topic of interest.
4.3 Mathematical Examination
In this section, we examine the analytic properties of the key equa-
tions that are used to derive our measure. We also show that our measure




Here we show that given p0i , i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N}, and that behavioral
primitives β and δij satisfy a certain regularity condition, a unique so-
lution {pi; i = 1,2, . . . ,N} of equation (4.2) exists, and when the pis are
viewed as functions of the p0i s, the partial derivatives in equation (4.3) are
well-defined.
We rewrite equation (4.2) here, absorbing the second term into p0i ,
−pi + βp0i + (1− β)
N∑
j=1
gijδijpj = 0,∀i. (4.5)
(4.5) specifies a system of N equations with N unknown variables pi, i ∈
{1,2, . . . ,N}, so, informally, as long as the N equations are mutually com-
patible, we can solve the pis, in terms of the primitives and p0i s. Moreover,
if none of the equations are redundant, then the solution is unique.
We formalize it in the framework of Implicit Function Theorem.
Given β and δij , the left hand side of equation (4.5) defines a continuously





] = −I + (1− β)Gδ, where Gδ =

g11δ11 g12δ12 · · · g1nδ1n





gn1δn1 gn2δn2 · · · gnnδnn

(4.6)
is invertible,3 then there exists a unique continuous differentiable func-
3A sufficient condition is 0 < β ≤ 1 and δijs are nonnegative.
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tion p : RN → RN that




1, . . . , p
0
N)) = 0
and the partial derivatives ∂pi∂p0j
, i, j ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N}, are well-defined.
Relationship with PageRank
PageRank (Brin and Page 1998), the founding stone of the Google
Internet search engine, is a link analysis algorithm. It assigns a “numerical
weighting to each element of a hyperlinked set of documents, such as the
World Wide Web, with the purpose of ‘measuring’ its relative importance
within the set.” PageRank can be interpreted in the following way: All web
surfers start on a random page in the set of documents; at any moment,
they either choose to follow a random link from the page they are cur-
rently visiting or jump to a random page in the whole set. The PageRank
value of a webpage i is then the probability that a random surfer is on
webpage i. Like our measure, the algorithm of RageRank is based purely
on the graph, i.e., the structure of links among the documents. In this
subsection we show that if we directly apply PageRank to our context, it
is actually equivalent to our measure NI with a specific choice of β and
δij .
The most widely used version of PageRank should satisfy the fol-
lowing equation:









where PR(·) is a webpage’s numeric PageRank value and constant N is
the size of the set of webpages. The second term on the right hand of
the equation is a summation over all webpage js which have an out-link
to i. o(i) is the total number of out-links of i. d is a parameter called
damping factor in Page and Brin’s original paper, and is usually set to
0.85 in practice. It has been shown that, for d ∈ [0,1), there is a unique
vector of PRs that satisfies (4.7). The larger the value of PR(i) is, the
more important webpage i is relative to other ones.
When we abstract both webpages and network members as nodes,
and both hyperlinks and influence-relationships as directed edges, a hy-
perlinked set of webpages and an influence network of human users are
structurally the same: Both of them are graphs, i.e., a set of nodes linked
by directed edges. From this perspective, the PageRank measure of impor-
tance can be directly used here in our social network context, even though
its original interpretation of a random surfer clicking links no longer ap-
plies. To make the definition (4.7) consistent with our notation, note that
o(i) =
∑
j gij and hence we can rewrite








Now we show that when we set the behavioral primitives β = 1−d
and δij = 1∑j gij for is such that
∑
j gij 6= 0, our measure of network influ-
ence, NI, and PageRank, PR, are mathematically equivalent. We continue
using the notation Gδ in the previous section. With the specific choice
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of δij , Gδ is just a very simple transformation of the graph matrix G: For
each row i that
∑
j gij 6= 0, we divide each element gij in the row by
∑
j gij .
Simply call the transformed matrix Ĝ. Below is an example of G-Ĝ pair.
G =

0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0












0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0

It is easy to see that, with this specification, we are assuming each influ-
encer j of individual i imposes equal influence on i’s decision of adopting
y .
We represent the relevant systems of equations in matrix form.
Let E(n,m) be an n ×m matrix whose elements are all ones. Let PR =
(PR(1), PR(2), . . . , PR(N))′. Then we can write equation (4.8)
PR = dĜ′ · PR + (1− d)
N
E(N,1), (4.9)
where operator · is matrix multiplication and ′ is transposition. Similarly
(4.3) can be rewritten as
PA = βI + (1− β)Gδ · PA, (4.10)
where PA is an N × N matrix whose element i, j is ∂pi∂p0j . Replacing the
primitives, equation (4.10) becomes
PA = (1− d)I + dĜ · PA. (4.11)
Lastly the relationship between our network influence measure NI and
matrix PA, as implied by (4.4), can be written in matrix form
NI = PA′ · E(N,1). (4.12)
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The key result we want to prove is PR(i) = 1NNI(i), ∀i. From
equation (4.11) we have
(I − dĜ) · PA
1− d = I.
So 11−dPA = (I − dĜ)−1 (invertibility is assumed in the previous section).
By the property of invertible square matrix, we have also
(I − dĜ′) · PA
′
1− d = I.
Multiplying both sides by (1−d)N E(N,1) gives
(I − dĜ′) · PA
′
N
E(N,1) = (1− d)
N
E(N,1).







Thus the NI values only differ from the PR values by a constant scaling
factor, which is just the size of the social network in consideration. By
doing this exercise, we essentially show that our model can serve as a
behavioral foundation for applying the classic PageRank algorithm, which
was originally developed for ranking the importance of hyperlinked doc-
uments on the Internet, to this new task of ranking network members in
terms of their influence. However, as we have found in the preceding two
chapters, the “equal-influence” assumption (Ĝ), which is really the basis of
PageRank, should be modified for different acts in consideration and we
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should leave the option of choosing specific forms for δij open for differ-
ent applications. As we deviate from the “equal-influence” assumption,
our model can provide more structure of influence than the PageRank
measure.
4.4 Numerical Experiment
In this section, we use the Watts-Strogatz network model (Watts
and Strogatz 1998) to simulate pseudo influence networks as the context
to compute our measure. The goal of the numerical exercises is to show
how the distribution of the individuals’ network influences, as captured
by the measure NI, changes, when we use different choices of δij . Specif-
ically, we relate δij to the strength of the social tie between i and j, or the
closeness between i and j. For each simulated network, we compute three
different variants of NI. The first is based on the “equal-local-influence”
assumption, under which we have shown that NI is equivalent to PageR-
ank. For the second variant, we assume that strong ties or close relation-
ships carry a larger person-to-person influence, as is in the venue-visit
case in the third chapter. For the third variant, we assign greater weights
of local influences on weak ties, to incorporate situations like information
diffusion discussed in Chapter Two.
The network model we adopt here is popularized by Watts and
Strogatz (1998) and we illustrate it in Figure 4.1. The population (size
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N) lives on a one-dimensional lattice and each individual is connected
to a small number of nearest neighbors (denoted K, following Watts and
Strogatz (1998) we require N > K > ln(N)) by undirected edges. So these
edges represent strong relationships: Each individual influences and is in-
fluenced by his or her close neighbors. Next, for each edge, with probabil-
ity pw , we disconnect one end of the edge and reconnect it to an individual
chosen uniformly at random in the population, creating the “shortcuts”
in the figure. And these relationships are weak ties. Thus, pw determines
the density of these “shortcuts”. In Figure 4.1, we show two examples with
pw = 10% and pw = 50% respectively.4 The Watts-Strogatz model, often
labeled “small-world” network model, has a fairly simple structure. Yet,
it resembles the real social network in possessing two important proper-
ties when pw is small: “short average distance” between a pair of nodes
(Milgram 1967) and the “high clustering” effect (Newman 2003).
To compute our NI measures, we still need to decide on β and
δij . We set β = 0.15, following the standard practice of PageRank. For
the more important primitive δij , we apply three specifications based on
three different schemes of weighting influence relationships according to
the strength of the relationship. We use the method of comparing the
social neighborhoods to measure tie strength, as we did in Chapter Two.
Specifically, our metric is the first version of the overlap index developed
4In both cases, we use a small N = 50 for clearness of visualization. In later simula-
tions, we shall use much larger Ns.
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oij lies in the interval of [0,1]. The higher index oij is, the more similar
i and j’s social neighborhoods and the stronger their relationship. The
rationale of the index is the strength of the social tie theory in sociology
(Granovetter 1973). Interested readers can refer to Chapter Two and its
appendix. Building on index oij , our three specifications of δij are:
























(1− oik) 6= 0.
We first show that, given an influence structure, the three specifi-
cations can indeed produce different orderings of network influence. A
simple influence-network example is given in Figure 4.2, where N = 20,
K = 4, and pw = 20%. The three variants of the network influence mea-
sure, NIN , NIS , and NIW , computed based on (4.4) and the corresponding
orderings (the columns labeled “ID”) are shown in Table 4.1. We find that
the three variants do suggest different influence rankings for the 20 indi-
viduals. Take user 07 for example. In the N case, 07 is ranked at about
the median; in the S case where strong-ties are designated to carry larger
influence, she is ranked at the 70th percentile; and in the W case in which
larger weights are put on weak ties, she is ranked at the 25th percentile.
The relative high ranking of her in the S case and the low ranking in the
W case should be consistent with the intuition, since user 07 influences
and is influenced by four close social neighbors 05, 06, 08 and 09, and
does not have any weak ties.
We now investigate how the distribution of network influence NI
in a population changes with different specifications of δij . We choose
N to be 5,000 and K to be 10. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of NIs
in four typical networks corresponding to pw = 5%, 10%, 45% and 50%


















Figure 4.2: An Example of NI Orderings: Influence Network
lated network structurally resembles the “small world” networks in hu-
man society. We find that NIS and NIW both are more dispersed than
NIN . Moreover, while the distribution of NIN is more or less symmetric
around its mean (i.e., 1), the distribution of NIS is negatively skewed and
the distribution of NIW is positively skewed. The difference indicates that
when considering acts that more frequently transmit through weak ties,
for example the dissemination of new information, in a small world where
weak ties are a scarce resource, the distribution of influence skews heav-
ily towards a small group of network members who have relatively more
weak ties; by contrast, for acts that more readily diffuse through strong
relationships, such as the adoption of venue-visits which we discussed in
Chapter Three, the bulk of influence is shared by a majority part of the
population. In the bottom two subplots, pw is relatively large. In these
networks, weak ties are no longer a scarce resource, and the distributions
127
Rank N S W
ID NIN ID NIS ID NIW
1 06 1.458 06 1.359 06 1.610
2 10 1.280 10 1.255 20 1.515
3 17 1.277 17 1.159 17 1.457
4 20 1.276 02 1.144 10 1.311
5 02 1.085 20 1.122 18 1.100
6 14 1.067 07 1.098 09 1.099
7 15 1.062 15 1.072 14 1.085
8 04 1.044 08 1.063 04 1.057
9 18 1.020 14 1.061 15 1.053
10 09 1.013 04 1.038 19 1.046
11 07 1.010 18 0.973 02 0.991
12 08 1.004 12 0.959 08 0.900
13 19 0.848 03 0.958 13 0.869
14 11 0.842 09 0.950 11 0.865
15 13 0.841 16 0.939 07 0.862
16 12 0.833 05 0.875 01 0.666
17 03 0.819 13 0.827 05 0.663
18 16 0.809 11 0.827 16 0.621
19 05 0.793 19 0.720 12 0.619
20 01 0.621 01 0.600 03 0.609
Table 4.1: An Example of NI Orderings: Rank
of NIS and NIW become closer to each other.
For a given pw value, we generate a large number of networks. For
each of these networks, we compute the second and third moments5 of
the distributions of NIN , NIS and NIW . We then calculate the mean stan-
dard deviation and the mean skewness across all simulations for a given
pw . In Figure 4.4, we plot these mean moments against pw . From the up-
per subplot, we can see that weighting ties of different strength enlarges
the variance of the distribution and our NIW variant has a even larger
variance than NIS . The lower subplot shows our two different weighting































































































































































Figure 4.3: Distribution of NI
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schemes produce opposite results on skewness. The difference of skew-
ness is specially significant for small pw . As pw approaches 0.5, the skew-
ness of the three distributions become closer. These results again show
that the freedom of choosing δij gives our measure NI more power to
capture the rich structure of the distribution of influence than PageRank.
4.4.1 Extension to Item Ranking
The NI measure ranks the individuals of a social network in terms
of their influence. The measure can then be used as an influence weight
to rank items. Suppose that we have computed NI regarding the choice of
movies and a total of J movies are discussed and endorsed by the network
members. Let matrix A be an N × J user-movie matrix that has entries
specified as follows: Aij denotes the fraction of the endorsement from
individual i that goes to movie j. Then, a weighted total endorsement for
movie j can be obtained by T(j) =
∑N
i=1AijNI(i), based on which the J
movies can be ordered.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose a methodology to score and rank the in-
dividuals in a social network in terms of their relative influence regarding
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Figure 4.4: The Second and Third Moments of NI Distribution
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decision-making and relies only upon the influence network structure.
The proposed measure depends on two behavioral primitives, which we
argue should be best determined on an application-to-application basis.
We also show that with one specific choice of the primitives, our measure
is equivalent to the popular PageRank algorithm. We conduct numerical
experiments by simulating Watts-Strogatz networks. For each of the sim-
ulated networks, we compute the influence measure using three different
specifications of the free primitives, which are inspired by our findings
in the preceding two chapters. We show that our measure is indeed able
to capture a richer structure of the influence distribution in a networked
population.
Our study has a number of limits and they also shed light on pos-
sible future research directions. First, in our model, the primitive β is
assumed to be exogenous and identical across all individuals. One in-
teresting research direction is to explore the possibility of relaxing this
restriction and endogenizing β, probably by allowing β to be correlated
with the number of one’s influencers. Indeed, individuals who put a larger
weight on themselves (i.e., larger β) may choose to have fewer influencers.
Second, we assume the primitives are given by the researcher or practi-
tioner who implements the measure. One future research question would
be, if a researcher observes the outcomes yis, then can the primitives be
estimated from the data? Third, the three specifications of δij we have
experimented are constructed based on the strength of the relationship
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between i and j, which is operationalized by evaluating the overlap of
i and j’s social neighborhoods. Researchers can explore other specifica-
tions of δij in the future. Lastly, the effectiveness of our measure should
be tested against existing methodologies by using observational data pro-





Unidirectional Relationships as Weak Ties
In this appendix, we discuss our operationalization of weak ties
used in our empirical analyses. We define tie strength based on the
following-follower relationships observed in the Twitter network, and specif-
ically, we claim that unidirectional relationships are on average weaker
than bidirectional ones. We want to stress a few points regarding this
assumption. First, we are not claiming that a bidirectional relationship
in the Twitter world is a strong tie in the absolute sense. Twitter users,
even if they are mutually connected online, often barely know each other
in the real world, so to a certain extent, the claim that almost all ties on
Twitter are weak is a fair one to make. The hypothesis only emphasizes
the ordinal strength of the two tie types, and the comparison is carried
out in the sense of probabilistic expectation. The reason why reciprocity
makes a difference is that frequent learning or regular interaction is more
likely to happen when a reciprocal relationship exists. By reading each
other’s posts, a pair of users can more easily develop mutual understand-
ing about each other’s topics of interest and expertise, and sometimes
even about detailed aspects of each one’s personal life. Over time, even
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though the pair are unknown to each other in the real world, they could
probably become very familiar with each other’s activities and habits in
the online community. Of course, reciprocal following does not guaran-
tee such relationship development (which is why we emphasize the prob-
abilistic nature of the hypothesis). However, without it, the relationship
development is unlikely. Moreover, our operationalization is consistent
with the previous sociological literature. Granovetter (1973) pointed out
the importance of reciprocity by defining that “the strength of a tie is a
(probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional inten-
sity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which
characterize the tie.” In Friedkin (1982), asymmetrical contact between
college professors was classified as a weak tie, and a reciprocal connec-
tion was classified as a strong tie. Marlow et al. (2009) also applied similar
definitions in analyzing friendships on Facebook.
We perform an empirical test on the hypothesis, using the network
graph data we collected. Note that we know not only the number of fol-
lowings (followers) a user has, but also whom the followings (followers)
are (i.e., we observe the IDs of the user’s immediate social neighbors in
our database). This information should give us more knowledge about,
and in the meantime the ability to build important metrics of, a user’s
network characteristics. In particular, knowing the IDs of two users’ so-
cial neighbors, we can compare how “similar” their social neighborhoods
are. In deriving his theory, Granovetter in his 1973 paper claimed that
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the stronger the social tie between two persons, the larger the overlap of
their friendship circles. Applying this statement in the Twittersphere, un-
der our assumption, we would expect that two users who mutually follow
each other, on average, have a larger overlap in their followings (followers)
than two who don’t. Our test is based on this prediction. Operationally,
we do so by empirically verifying whether wti = 0 positively correlates
with a higher “similarity” between user ti and author t’s followings (fol-
lowers). We measure “similarity” by computing two overlap indexes of










where V̄ti, Vt, and Vti are the number of mutual followings author t and
user ti shared, the number of followings author t had, and the number of
followings i had, respectively (Onnela et al. 2007 defined a similar “neigh-
borhood overlap”). Similarly, we can define and compute overlap indexes
of followers (OIW1ti , OI
W2
ti ) by changing V to W in equation (A.1). Note that
the two numerators in equation (A.1) are the same: V̄ti. The difference
between OIV1ti and OI
V2
ti is in the denominators, or in the way by which we
scale down V̄ti based on the number of followings ti has. Both indexes
are in the range [0,1] because V̄ti ≤min{Vt, Vti}. The larger the indexes
are, we say the more “similar” the two sets of followings are. When t and
ti have no mutual followings shared, both indexes equal 0. When t and ti
have exactly the same sets of followings, OIV1ti = 1. When ti’s followings
represent a subset/superset of t’s followings, OIV2ti = 1.
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OIV1 OIV2 OIW1 OIW2
wti -0.042*** -0.069*** -0.034*** -0.064***
F (2322.21) (1476.43) (3837.34) (2158.65)
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table A.1: Results of ANOVA Tests
We investigate wether different wti values lead to significantly dif-
ferent overlap indexes by running a series of ANOVA tests, the results of
which are given in Table A.1. In all four tests, we control tweet-specific
effects. As the regression coefficients in the first row show, we find that
a unidirectional relationship (wti = 1) is indeed associated with a smaller
overlap in social neighborhoods. The F statistics and p-values indicate
this difference is significant at 0.1% level, no matter which index we use.
Therefore, bidirectional relationships are associated with higher transi-
tivity in social neighborhoods. The results thus support our hypothe-













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure B.1: The Spread of a Single Tweet (idx=1) in Our Sample
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